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Gilbert Murray: War and Civilization

New Republic

McCarthy and the Army

What's in the "Subversive" Army Intelligence Report on Communist Siberia?

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T. R. B. *Washington Wire*

You pinch yourself in Washington and say, "This really is unbelievable." Last week for instance. Inside the little room off the Capitol rotunda Army Secretary Stevens had gone in two hours ago with Senators McCarthy, Dirksen, Mundt and Potter. He had gone in a hero declaring that he would not have soldiers bullied, as General Zwicker was. His defiance had gone 'round the world. A London editor cabled an order for a week-end story "Stevens: The Giant Killer." The corridor churned with reporters. At 2:45 p.m. the doors opened.

The drive forward was a subway rush complicated by a three-alarm fire. Yelling radio and TV men bore in clanking apparatus. From then on everything was spoken in screams. In the room's center was a portable lunch table covered with used chicken bones. On the leather sofa sat Stevens, the sheltered, free-enterprising manufacturer, betwixt Senators. At one side the first wave of reporters caught Mundt, tap-tapping with pudgy fingers the "Memorandum of Understanding," the memorandum Secretary Stevens never heard till it was read aloud. The tin TV bowls of furnace light snapped on. Mundt shouted the surrender document at a pace no reporter could take. As they screamed, Mundt would say, "I'll repeat that passage" and rattle it off faster than ever. Stevens seemed in shock. He wore a blue suit, silver hair and red face. Cameramen said "smile!" and he turned on a sickly grin with Joe's hairy hand on his shoulder, the kind of grin made by contracting the right facial muscles. Then he lapsed back. He looked like one who had been in an auto accident.

Reporters had predicted that "Joe will take off Stevens' vest without even unbuttoning his coat!" He had done worse. He had taken Stevens' reputation. There was no word in the Mundt document about not bullying future McCarthy witnesses. Cameramen told Stevens to wait and he did, but suddenly, with a galvanic jerk he said, "I've had enough of this," and walked right out of the room. McCarthy's comment was different. Quite unable to contain himself he asked reporters gleefully in the corridor, "Anybody want a commission?"

You pinch yourself and say "This is a nightmare!" But it goes on. Now it is Friday. McCarthy has summoned a press conference to wind things up. In the meantime desperate White House face-saving efforts have been made. Stevens has declared there was an unexpressed codicil in the surrender terms against bullying Army witnesses. The President (who has stopped golfing to attend the last 30 minutes of a long White House strategy session) is quoted as saying he is with Stevens "100 percent"; McCarthy has contemptuously called the new Stevens' version "false." So now the time has come for the victorious Joe to do the wind up, glad-hand act—pat the defeated Administration patronizingly on the head and assure them of his undying support. The repeated affair falls into a pattern.

So this scene is the McCarthy committeeroom with reporters jamming the horse-shoe bench normally occupied by Senators, looking down on Joe in the well—seven microphones before him, three incandescent tin light bowls on him, and seven movie and TV cameras whirring away. European correspondents are conspicuous; they look down and keep asking, "How strong is America?" They keep asking each other that. They do not trust the Americans' answer any more. Down below they see in this relaxed, burly figure with the hairy hands, blue-black jowls, narrow dark-lidded eyes, a prototype they have watched before in Europe. They know the breed—but this is an American variation. He is not drunk with his own ranting like the one in Berlin; he is not self-deluded, like the gaudy one in Rome. He is coldly and frighteningly self-analytical even when registering genial relaxation, as in scenes like this. He watches every word's reaction. . . . And he has just taken another step forward to control of the Republican Party. How far will he go?

The Senator pooh-poohs everything. He is friends with everybody again! He denies saying things everyone knows he said. He flatly denies he ever told war-hero General Zwicker that he "is not fit to wear that uniform," though every reporter in the room has read the printed transcript. And this is frightening, too. How many times have Washington reporters let a man deny flatly what every man knows is true? That is what we do.

Let us summarize and drop the subject. McCarthy could operate like this only in an atmosphere of moral cowardice in the White House. The American Presidency is a half-mystical office; the function is part political, part high priest. When the high priest compounds with a McCarthy the nation suffers. The Republican National Committee is desperate over the fall election; it counts on McCarthy to defeat liberal Senators like Humphrey, Kefauver and Douglas. And Ike is captive of that policy. He is afraid of destroying party unity. He was not afraid in France, but this is different. So Joe goes down the hall gaily asking, "Any of you boys want commissions?"

Notes: Herbert Hoover told an audience here last week that he knew from experience there would be no depression, and you couldn't hear the applause for the knees knocking together. . . . Some months back *Life* and *Time* declared McCarthy would be forgotten if left-wing publications like this one did not keep publicizing him for their own selfish interests; we assume Luce publications will make no mention of the Senator this week. . . . The trouble is you can't ignore a man who keeps jumping out of the Empire State Building and landing safe. . . . Get ready for tax cuts soon; Democrats are for them and Republicans are caving in. . . . Democrats' silence on McCarthy strikes us as just about as pusilanimous as Republicans'; timidity affects both parties. The universal sense of shock which followed the attempted assassinations in the House made me realize that however odious and menacing character assassination of one's political opponents is, it fades nearly into insignificance before the ultimate threat to free government—the attempt to get what you want by murder. . . . Everybody's morale sank in the Army last week save Corp. David Schine's.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Ike and Joe

IN REVIEWING McCarthy's treatment of General Zwicker, the general staff stood on the principle that the Secretary of the Army alone is responsible to Congress. In turn, Secretary Stevens endorsed the principle. To the rest of the Administration, however, the principle was less important than the Republican Party and its two leading assets, Ike and Joe. The Republican Party intends to win in 1954 with Ike *and* Joe—Ike to talk about the American way; Joe to betray it by tarring Democratic candidates with charges of treason. This plan required the surrender of Secretary Stevens.

The surrender appalled many who had believed that when it came to his own lifelong comrades in arms, Eisenhower would not preside over the crumbling of the Executive power. Even the *Chicago Tribune* had rebuked McCarthy for his treatment of General Zwicker.

So the White House intervened at last. Once again the President acted only after the pattern was set. Even when the White House meeting was called, the President let his subordinates determine his course of action while he practiced chip shots on the White House lawn. Within the building, columnists pictured two groups struggling for the President's soul. The first group of appeasers were readily identified as Vice-President Nixon, White House liaison officer General Wilton Persons, Assistant Attorney-General William Rogers and others; but who made up the second group among the President's advisers, of men who wished to stand on principle? None could be named. The discussion in the White House was concerned only with strategy. The task set was not: *How is the integrity of the Executive to be upheld?* but rather: *How can the public be persuaded that the surrender was not a surrender after all?* This task was undertaken in the statement issued by Secretary Stevens with the President's backing; two days later, on March 1, the *New York Times* reported:

> The established fact is that the Secretary of the Army never received any message of support from the President at any time during the controversy and has not received one yet.

The White House explained this inaction by stating that the Army was on weak ground in the matter of Major Peress; therefore, echoed some conservative columnists, this was not the time to fight. To this claim there are two obvious answers.

First, in terms of principle, no government is entitled to defend the foundations of sound administration only when its case is good. When Secretary Stevens held that he alone was accountable to Congress for whatever mistakes had been made, he was upholding the first principle of sound administration.

Second, the notion that the Administration can elect to fight McCarthy at times and places of its own choosing is naïve. McCarthy for one applies the strategy advocated by Secretary Dulles—that he will choose the time and the place—and on this matter, his is the initiative.

This does not mean that the President will not again boil over in momentary anger if he feels that he has been humiliated. To forestall any such outburst of honest and spontaneous emotion on the President's part, the Republican command has created the appearance of action to clean up the Senate Committees, rushing to completion a bill for reforming procedures before the Eisenhower press conference on the Zwicker affair. This much may satisfy an easygoing President, without inhibiting the other leading member of the Republican team.

To those who want more in the way of resistance, the apologists of inaction have one more comforting word about McCarthy: "Give him enough rope and he will hang himself." The phrase is misleading. A man hangs from a given length of rope, at whose other end is a limb firmer than his neck.

And I'd still like to see you become President

Thank You, But . . .

THE BRICKER amendment and its various offsprings have been defeated in the Senate—by one vote. The Amendment could only be argued as a protection for civil rights in the event that a President and two-thirds of the Senate should become determined to scrap the Constitution—but since anyone willing to throw out the first 22 articles of the Constitution would hardly cherish Bricker's proposed 23rd that could hardly be the real intent of its backers.

The actual purpose of the amendment is revealed by the foreign-policy voting records of its hard-core supporters, Bricker (R, Ohio), Dirksen (R, Ill.), McCarthy (R, Wis.), Malone (R, Nev.), Welker (R, Idaho) and by such statements as Bricker's "the UN is destined for an early demise." These men, opposed to the present as well as the past Administration's foreign policy, want to capture so

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Why McCarthy Thrives

WE ARE CONFRONTED today with so frightening an ignorance, with political ambitions so ruthless and reckless, with a view of human affairs so shallow and childish, above all with an intolerance so savage, that I cannot be complacent either about the causes or the effects of these phenomena. What is involved here is not just the demagogery of individual politicians. What is important is the echo they produce in broad masses of the American public. And I find it insufficient to explain this tolerantly by saying that our people are impatient with the present frustrations in foreign affairs, or that many of them consider themselves to have been betrayed by FDR and the New Deal, and this is the revenge. These things all have substance; but behind these reactions there lies a more serious bewilderment and a forgetfulness. These symptoms could only have been occasioned by deep deficiencies in educational preparation and environmental influence, by a failure on the part of many people to understand the first principles of the American society to which they belong, by a failure to react truly and alertly to tendencies incompatible with these principles. – *From an address by George F. Kennan published in the Princeton Alumni Weekly.*

strong a veto power over decisions in that field as to force any Administration to give them a major role in *formulating* foreign policy.

They have been temporarily defeated. And the vote revealed the President's profound dependence upon liberal Democrats—joining a handful of Eisenhower Republicans—for protection against the anti-internationalists of his party. Yet he has allowed the 1954 Republican campaign to be entrusted to just those men. And if McCarthy and his company should succeed in unseating a few Democrats like Paul Douglas of Illinois or Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, the Bricker Amendment will be introduced again next year—with far more chance of passing.

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There'll Always Be . . .

TOO RADICAL for US politicians of both parties, the Brannan plan has been exported. Churchill's Conservative government has not only adopted it but will broaden it.

The Tories have an election to fight between now and 1956, so farm income must be kept high. Yet, as Conservatives, they want to scrap the intricate wartime structure of guaranteed purchases and prices—which increased production 50 percent during the past 15 years—while continuing to boost production and earnings. The only answer, they feel, is to let farm prices find their own level in the open market, and to pay the farmer a "deficiency payment" whenever prices fall below a guaranteed minimum. This is the essence of the plan Charles Brannan proposed for US perishable products when he was Truman's Secretary of Agriculture. The Tories will apply it to non-perishables as well.

There will, the Tories point out, be no bills for expensive storage of surpluses such as plague the US, no criticism that they have betrayed their heritage by perpetuating government interference and state control in the form of price supports and acreage allotments, and, they hope, no angry farmers marching on the polls to "chuck 'em out."

The Eisenhower Administration already has had to apply Brannan's principles to wheat—but only to wheat. Yet if Churchill dares, can Ike be far behind?

Of Seeds and Men

LAST YEAR it became apparent that service on Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson's various advisory committees was not without indirect benefits. Eighty thousand tons of peas were secretly sold by the Department to a syndicate for $30 a ton less than the price offered other buyers. Since the man who handled the deal for the syndicate was a member of Benson's Agricultural Advisory Committee, there was some Congressional protest. The President of the Commodity Credit Corporation admitted "we made a mistake" and promised "we ain't going to do it no more." But it seems to have been done again, only bigger and better.

Rep. Pat Sutton (D, Tenn.) recently received a letter from a Memphis seed company: it had just learned that the

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Department of Agriculture had sold 21 million pounds of seed; it had received no pre-sale notification; it had been in business 40 years, would have bid for some of that seed, deserved to be notified, and just what was going on.

Sutton looked into the matter and found that 15 million pounds of that seed, costing the government more than $6 million, had been sold for less than $2 million to a syndicate of five companies; each company had a representative on Benson's Seed Industry Advisory Committee and the syndicate was headed by the chairman of the Seed Industry Advisory Committee, Lloyd M. Brown; the Agriculture Department did not advertise the sale in the usual way but sent out only a limited-circulation press release stating that offers would be considered; a time limit of one week was set for such offers; one day before dispatch of the limited circulation press release the Department sent out its regular monthly price list to other companies quoting prices for the same 15 million pounds of seed three times as high as those paid by the syndicate a few weeks later and stating "assurance is given buyers . . . that prices will not be reduced before July 1, 1954."

As he forwarded this information to the Justice Department, Sutton was heard to remark about "an odor like that of a pile of fish lying in the sun for a week."

Foul! Foul!

Sen. William Jenner (R, Ind.) is the man who illegally drew monthly "military disability payments" for nine years before he was challenged and forced to repay $12,000 to the government. From the sanctuary of the Senate floor, he called Gen. George C. Marshall "an eager front man for traitors" and "a living lie." He threw unsupported accusation after accusation at Dean Acheson and asked for the impeachment of Truman for turning over the country to "a secret inner coterie which is directed by . . . Moscow."

But when his friend Clarence Manion was fired as chairman of the Presidential Commission on Inter - Governmental Relations because he was neglecting his work to make speeches for the anti-Administration Bricker amendment, Jenner became concerned. "I hope Manion will have an opportunity to confront his accuser," he said. And "if he is to be made to walk the plank because he has certain fundamental things he believes in . . . we are living in a dangerous age."

Plum Picking in Wisconsin

Madison, Wis.

McCARTHY has bluntly served notice on the Republican Party organization and the Wisconsin Bar Association that he is pushing his closest personal friend and political associate, Urban Van Susteren, for appointment as judge of the new federal district court created in this state. Van Susteren is an attorney in McCarthy's home town of Appleton, and McCarthy makes his home with him on his infrequent visits there.

The judgeship is the juiciest political plum the Republican Administration will hand out in Wisconsin, and it is being eagerly sought by a number of Republcan lawyers, most of whom have far more distinguished records than McCarthy's friend.

Van Susteren first achieved statewide recognition in 1946 when he served as Outagamie County divorce counsel in Judge McCarthy's Circuit Court at Appleton at the time that McCarthy was granting "quickie divorces" to some of his political supporters and the clients of lawyers who were supporting him in his campaign for the US Senate. As campaign manager for McCarthy that year, he also received considerable publicity by soliciting campaign contributions on Judge McCarthy's official court stationery.

Because of Van Susteren's undistinguished record as a lawyer, it was not thought that McCarthy would dare to shove him down the throats of the bar and the Republican organization. But because of his enormous influence in the party organization, McCarthy's endorsement gives Van Susteren an excellent chance.

Yet there are signs of discontent. Sen. Alexander Wiley has said that he will make no recommendation until he hears from the bar. The *Wisconsin State Journal* at Madison, a strong McCarthy paper, is apparently displeased with McCarthy's choice. The paper recently pointed out that there are "older lawyers" (Van Susteren is in his early forties) who have been more active in party affairs.

"This is a touchy issue for President Eisenhower," the *Journal* said. "It is also a test of Senator McCarthy's political strength."

Van Susteren is a former LaFollette Progressive, who attached himself to McCarthy in 1939 when McCarthy was running for Circuit Judge. His own success in politics has been negligible. Along with McCarthy he was on the slate of delegates entered in the Wisconsin 1948 Presidential primary pledged to Harold Stassen. He ran as a delegate from the 8th Congressional District but was defeated by a MacArthur delegate. In that campaign McCarthy sent out a letter calling attention to the fact that General MacArthur was a divorced man and charging that the General was too old to serve as President. Although the district is heavily Catholic and Van Susteren is of that religious persuasion, the smear letter, which was designed to appeal to religious groups objecting to divorce, failed to win the necessary support.

Although members of the bar are afraid to tangle with McCarthy openly, it is expected that they will take steps to let the White House know of McCarthy's professional record in the state. They can point to a Supreme Court decision in which he was bitterly reprimanded as a Circuit Judge for destroying part of the records of a case that came up on appeal.

They also have the record which shows that in 1949 the State Board of Bar Commissioners asked the Supreme Court to take disciplinary action against McCarthy for "violating the public policy of the state of Wisconsin, the code of judicial ethics, his oath of office as a judge and his oath of office as a member of the bar."

In its brief the Board said that McCarthy had "knowingly and willfully placed the gratification of his personal ambition above the interests of the public and the rights of the litigants." The Court found McCarthy guilty of the charges against him but failed to discipline him because it felt that he would probably not repeat the performance.

McCarthy then seized upon the Court's failure to disbar him to charge that the conservative Board of Bar Commissioners had entered into a political conspiracy against him. He demanded the resignation of its members. The bar is still smarting from that and would like to hit back.

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McCarthy and the Army

THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON SIBERIA

☆

First Published Excerpts from the Official Army Orientation Document, Labeled "Prize Communist Propaganda" by McCarthy.

IF WAR COMES, will the Soviet people support their State? Will the young Soviet citizens in uniform fight as bravely against us as their brothers and fathers fought against Germany in World War II?

This question is among the most important that we face.

Fortunately for us, a million Japanese soldiers returned to the free world in 1951, after living and working for more than three years among the peoples of Soviet Siberia. Our Army understood that these prisoners offered "an unsurpassed opportunity to acquire information on popular attitudes." Accordingly, on the basis of intensive interrogation of the prisoners, a study was made by our Army's Far Eastern Command of the psychological and cultural traits of the peoples of Soviet Siberia. "The problem here," wrote the officer who forwarded the report, "is not to demonstrate the political injustice and economic tyranny of the Bolshevik Government but to illuminate the Russian in his existing Soviet habitat. . . ."

The basic conclusions of the report are these:

The Soviet citizen is a slave but does not know it.

He will fight bravely if war comes for what he believes to be the defense of his nation,

In peace or war, his optimism, his patriotism, his vitality and capacity for sacrifice are valuable assets at the disposal of the Soviet regime.

This study was prepared for the General Staff only, and was, of course, classified. But, as usual, a copy found its way to Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. McCarthy released brief sections of the report, labeled it "prize Communist propaganda," and demanded that the author be brought before his Committee.

On September 21, 1953, McCarthy attempted to force the Army to repudiate the report and to punish those responsible for its distribution. Summoning Gen. Richard C. Partridge, Commanding General of Army Intelligence, McCarthy declared (without evidence of any kind) that the report "quotes verbatim from Joe Stalin without attributing it to him"; that one book cited in its bibliography and edited by Professor Ernest Simmons of Columbia, was written "under direct instructions of the Soviet Embassy in Moscow," and that the report itself was plainly Communist propaganda. Ninety-five percent of the report, said McCarthy, was very favorable to the Communist regime and five percent critical of Communism. To offer five percent in criticism, he affirmed, was a typical Communist trick and thus, further proof of Communist authorship.

General Partridge, in reply, termed the report "an honest effort to deal with a very difficult subject." Under cross-examination he denied knowledge of the authors listed in Professor Simmons' book. McCarthy then classified General Partridge as one "who doesn't know the first thing about Communism." "Nothing on God's earth," said McCarthy of General Partridge, "is going to disturb him about Communism." He instructed Secretary Stevens, "Mr. Secretary, we need more than cooperation from a man like General Partridge." Stevens dutifully transferred General Partridge to a lesser post overseas.

In subsequent hearings, McCarthy called witnesses who further criticized the report. Louis Budenz identified certain authors in the Simmons book as Communists. Igor Bogolepov, a former official of the Soviet Foreign Office, testified that the report contained "deliberate misinformation which serves the Communist cause." Another Russian exile, Vladimir Petrov of Yale,

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maintained that the report was "extremely biased and unscientific." These witnesses, however, declined McCarthy's invitation to label the report as the creation of a Communist agent. This McCarthy himself did by printing the testimony, the body of the report itself, and the name of the Army Major who prepared it, under the title "Communist Infiltration in the Army."

Reading the full report, we feel some sympathy for the critical attitude of Budenz, Bogopelov and Petrov. The report is weak in its introduction, and is occasionally naïve. Much of what we would term naïveté, however, results from the stated nature of the report. For it presents the views of Russians themselves, and it presents them as seen by Japanese who in turn are not trained in critical analysis of totalitarian rule. Sound or unsound, it is a valuable contribution to debate.

This nation has been accustomed to searching out the truth in the give and take of free debate. Discussion of the strength of Russia, unfettered by blind prejudice, or blind fear, is vital today to the safety of the United States. This discussion McCarthy seeks now to outlaw. Research is to be forbidden if the results of the research are unwelcome; a man may be branded a Communist for presenting evidence that the Russians will fight. For McCarthy, this is a logical step. He has proclaimed the doctrine of inevitable war and held that *"delenda est Carthago"* must be our national motto. Accordingly he finds it necessary to suppress the dangerous thought that a war of annihilation can be ruinous for us as well as for Russia. But the very report which he condemns warns us how this illusion can wreck us all. In passing it notes:

> Innumerable reports of widespread discontent . . . and contempt for Communism in the USSR convinced the Nazi leaders that any severe external pressure would precipitate a general revolt in the Soviet hinterland. From the experience in other parts of Europe, they assumed there was little to fear from the population in Soviet areas which they might occupy. It was on this basis that a six weeks' campaign was deemed sufficient to establish German authority there. Instead, the Soviet people evinced a solidarity rivaled only by the British, and maintained partisan warfare in occupied areas on a scale that is unique in history. The scale and tempo of the German defeat was due in good part to their inability to assess Soviet public opinion and attitudes.

If the Army report which he brands Communist does nothing more than to remind us not to underestimate the costs of war, it will perform a much needed service. But beyond this the report is in itself a fascinating and important account of life behind the Iron Curtain. So we have devoted this issue to reprinting the major sections of the report. While some of the paragraphs McCarthy objects to are deleted for reasons of space, most are published here.

Is the report prize Communist propaganda or is it "an honest effort to deal with a very important subject"? We leave it to the reader to judge.

Army Report on Siberia

NUMEROUS misconceptions of the Russian mentality have arisen through popular and historical writings of foreigners who apply their own characteristic reactions to the supposed condition of the Russian peasant or Soviet "toiler." Allegations that the Russians are impassive, stoical, fatalistic and melancholy are both oversimplified and misleading. Russians, like many other peoples, genuinely enjoy the pathos of a dolorous song or a tragic play, and are readily moved to tears by them. They do accept national and local calamities, such as invasions, droughts, famines, and in recent times, increased work norms, and more stringent controls, with a quiet dolor which suggests passivity and stoicism. They are apt to agree that phenomena outside their control must be endured, and that it is useless to oppose the inevitable. This is correctly interpreted as fatalistic. The fault lies in regarding these negative attitudes as the characteristic and predominant coloring of the Russian mind. Unfortunately Western literature has long since pictured Russia as black and gloomy, and has falsely extended this psychological set to the people as well. These attitudes and reaction patterns do exist, as they do among all other people. However, they ordinarily occupy only a small place in Russian thought, and no objective day-to-day account of life in Russia fails to note the normal cheerfulness and good humor of the ordinary Russian. Like the "downtrodden" peasant of old Russia, he seems to enjoy life. . . .

The Russians are generally extroverted and material-minded. To the Japanese they seemed happy-go-lucky. They live only in the present, and spend their money as soon as they get it. When they do save, it is usually for some very immediate object. With this realistic orientation, the Russian is very unlikely to develop psychopathic troubles. The incidence of mental illness, as indicated by suicide, psychotic criminality, and even of neurotic traits, is apparently very low. Thousands of Japanese prisoners who were intimately acquainted with Russians throughout Siberia reported that they had never seen or heard of a Russian who was mentally ill. . . .

Russians are not disposed to introspection or moodiness. On the contrary, they are almost constantly occupied outside of working hours with social activities, household tasks, family life and reading. Moreover, they are generally optimistic even when a Westerner would expect them to be in utter despair. Young and middle-aged collective farmers in Eastern Siberia still speak, in complete sincerity, of a golden future, when there will be an abundance of everything, and a six-hour working day, though the older ones are generally convinced that conditions will never improve. The same is generally true of urban workers, many of whom sincerely expect a world of plenty by 1960. An outstanding example of the strength of Russian optimism is that of a Soviet engineer, separated from his wife seven years by an assignment in Siberia. Having repeatedly been refused a transfer, he left without permission, and was picked up a few weeks later near Moscow. Then returned to the same area as a convict, he told a former Japanese acquaintance that he had not given up hope. He still looked for-

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Army Report on Siberia

ward to rejoining his wife when he finished his five year sentence.

The Soviet people are passionately devoted to small personal possessions. They will cheerfully spend all they have for a gold ring, a fountain pen or a wrist watch. They will stint themselves for months to buy a phonograph or a bicycle, and take great pride in such possessions. Policemen can often be bribed with moderately expensive trinkets, and Japanese intelligence officers, prior to the Great Purge of 1936, were able to obtain military information from Soviet officers for very modest "gifts" of English woolens, other foreign-made textiles, cultured pearls, Scotch whisky and the like. These officers all disappeared in the purge, but the Russian love of attractive foreign goods remains so powerful that many secondary officials will succumb if approached alone, even when the prospects of escaping detection are fairly poor. For example, in 1936 a Soviet Major General in Moscow accepted such "gifts" of textiles at his wife's instigation, whereupon she lightened the work of the MVD (then responsible for internal security) by appearing at official functions in modish clothing of this material. More recently, Japanese prisoners report many instances of bribing a guard with a portion of the loot when caught in an act of thievery.

The universal psychological drive for social recognition, always intensely developed among peoples undergoing rapid economic expansion, and the attendant social changes, is at least as prominent among present-day Russians as it is among Americans. The intense Russian yearning for citations, medals, uniforms, prizes, and other insignia of distinction is thoroughly exploited by the Soviet government. Individual citations, such as the "Ready for Labor and Defense" medal, the "Mother Hero" medal, and the coveted title of "Stakhanovite Worker" and write-ups in the local and national Soviet press for outstanding individual production records in agriculture, transportation and industry are perpetually admired and respected. "Stalin prizes" in science, literature, cinematography, and many other fields are also powerful, though more distant, incentives to individual endeavor. The Russian drive for recognition is even more distinctive in its strong group-achievement emphasis. The Russian's unparalleled conditioning for group integration makes him extremely amenable to appeals for group or work-unit performance, and it is second nature to take pride in the plaques, certificates, awards and other marks of recognition accorded to his work-group. . . .

Westerners often find it difficult to acknowledge any element of spontaneity or real enthusiasm in these generous outbursts, and attempt to explain them as resulting from a vicious and vindictive Party control system, presupposing a general hostility for all control agencies. This is partly the case, and many of these movements originate from the Communist Government, or from Communist Party members on the lower levels. Moreover, the habitually obstructive or unco-operative worker is likely to be punished for "reactionary tendencies" or un-Soviet behavior, especially if his influence is spreading to others. But it must be remembered that the Communist Party has a highly developed technique for exploiting the generous sentiments of the people, and that there is a vast reservoir of such sentiments to exploit. The role of the Party member in the lower strata is far more persuasive than compulsive, and the exploitation of reward incentives, group spirit, and group pride is an indispensable part of the Soviet social drive mechanism, and has always played an essential role in Russian social dynamics. The process seems obscure, and even fraudulent to an American, since his cultural conditioning, though inclusive of many types of group values, nevertheless gives first place to personal ambition, private enterprise, and individual achievement. He regards appeals to group spirit as an insufficient stimulus for a strong response among adult farm and factory workers, though he would acknowledge their effectiveness in schools and colleges. Therefore, he over-emphasizes the importance of compulsion, fear and punishment in Russian society. The prospect of punishment is an important control factor, but it is not the prime motivation. Nor is the average Russian's daily thinking dominated by fear and apprehension, as an American's might be under the same circumstances. If it were, a high incidence of neuroticism and unstable personality would result, and this is not in evidence. . . .

The Russian Group

The Russian is socially aggressive in that he constantly seeks contacts. He does not like to be alone. For this reason, Soviet sentries, guards, and watchmen always work in pairs, and most Russians prefer larger groups, for real personal comfort. The Russian group is flexible and tolerant, and rarely displays characteristics of hostility or exclusiveness. For example, boys' gang-fights would be quite abnormal. A Russian actor, however insipid, will never be hissed off the stage. Rivalry between groups is often keen, but rarely antagonistic. When antagonism does develop, it is usually directed against an individual who controls, but is not a member of the group, such as a manager or foreman, and is expressed not in physical violence, or the threat of it, but in sullen criticism, and failure to respond to his attempts to initiate action. In this condition the group is likely to fall far short of its production norms until the manager is transferred to other work. . . . Russians are keen in criticism, and indulge in malicious gossip, but they are psychologically so dependent on continued membership in their social and vocational groups that they habitually curb their hostile reactions . . .

The Russian social group is marked for cheerfulness and geniality. Personal relations are extremely cordial, and though it is no longer the practice for Russian men to kiss full on the lips in greeting, men and women alike are apt to be very demonstrative in overt gestures of friendship and affection. This attitude extends especially to children, and the Soviet child is confident of receiving love and indulgence, wherever he goes. The Russian sense of humor is quite similar to that of Americans, and hilarity is normal in all social gatherings. Dancing is universally popular. Music is an invariable hallmark of a Russian social group, even if it is only a chance gathering of soldiers or workers. At the lunch hour and rest period, accordions and balalaikas (a type of mandolin) will appear, often to be accompanied by solo or group singing. People flock eagerly to attend a concert by the local traveling "orchestra" in the remotest Siberian villages, and music of good quality is a daily feature on Soviet radio programs. Drama is an almost equally popular art form. Most citizens try their hand at amateur theatricals, and every town has its theatre and local dramatic group, though it may lack facilities for showing motion pictures. Old classical plays such as those of Tolstoi and Chekhov are perennial favorites, but there is also

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a steady stream of new plays, mostly on Communist themes. Drama, as a live medium, contrasted to the passivity of the motion picture, is at least as effective in inculculating Soviet attitudes and values, and probably accounts for the slow development of cinematography. . . .

Basically, Russian ethics conform to the conventional Christian pattern of the West. Ideals of honesty, loyalty, duty and mutual obligation, though rationalized to the point of negation in dealing with the "hostile capitalistic powers," are applicable in personal relations within Soviet society. Children are required to show respect toward their parents and teachers (since 1936), and their government. Married couples should be mutually respectful, and should provide good care for their children. Everyone is expected to appreciate, and to return favors, and to repay loans. More important, everyone is expected to have a benevolent attitude toward his fellows, and to be congenial with them in daily association, and everyone is expected to do his honest share in all communal work

These values, though somewhat tampered with by the Soviet Government, constitute ancient principles of Russian conduct, and have been little changed for many centuries. Their deep influence accounts for much of the strength and stability of the Russian family, and for the stability of the Russian individual in his group. Chief among them is the general habit of benevolence. Though the Soviet Regime has been brutal in a sociological sense, it has not altered this aspect of Russian character. Russians do not seem to regard any individual as inherently good or bad, as is apt to be the case in Western culture. His acts may be good or bad, wise or foolish, and he must accept the consequences, either way. The man himself, whatever his acts, is usually immune to destruction, though liable to punishment. In Western literature, the murderer is hanged, and whoever has taken a life loses his own. . . . Both in Czarist and Communist Russia, capital punishment has been declared illegal for considerable periods, and when legal, as at present, is reserved for the gravest crimes against the state, such as treason and espionage. The villain in Russian literature is defeated, humiliated and disgraced, but he is rarely killed, or abused physically, and the hero is under no obligation to overpower him in a fist fight. Again, Russian group orientation supersedes individualist orientation. The hero-villain relationship is not primarily that of man-versus-man, but involves a group-versus-man conflict. The hero is the protagonist of the group, and a one-punch fight, with strong group support for the hero is usually more than enough to quell the adversary.

Striking a man is considered a grave insult, and in the rare instances noted by Japanese prisoners, a minor crisis invariably arose in consequence. In Eastern Siberia, for example, a Russian engineer struck an immediate Russian subordinate, and to hush up the affair, had to bribe his superior with a load of wood. Near Irkutsk, a Russian supervisor struck a Japanese furnace tender. All work stopped, and there was an investigation. Apparently, the supervisor was vindicated, since the prisoner was transferred to another factory. Russian children threw stones at the Japanese prisoners as long as they regarded them as "enemy" soldiers, but the attitude soon gave way to friendly relations. Russian adults,

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from the start, were kindly and sympathetic, giving the Japanese little gifts of food, clothing and cigarettes, and frequently invited those who learned a few words of Russian to their homes for meals. Russian guards were sometimes abusive in speech to individual prisoners, but almost never mistreated them physically. Applying "on-the-spot justice" near Khabarovsk, a woman judge gave one Russian labor supervisor a five-year sentence for allowing dangerous conditions in which a Japanese prisoner was accidentally killed on the job, and in another instance a Russian doctor received a seven-year sentence for allowing a Japanese prisoner to die in a hospital, presumably through negligence. Even more illustrative is the case of the Russian truckdriver in the Chita area, who received a three-year sentence for calling a Mongol worker a "non-Russian" (nye-Russky). The legal principles underlying these cases involve purely Russian

WHO TITLED IT?



HEARING
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

It might be assumed that titles on official government documents are objective descriptions of the contents. But documents originating in Congressional committees bear titles chosen by the committee staff and approved by the committee chairman. And, as the above indicates, they can be a simple propaganda device.

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concepts of justice, which have merely been adopted by the Soviet Government.

Thievery is probably the most common offense in the USSR, and in the absence of all other punishable offenses, would provide an ample supply of convict laborers. State property is everybody's property, and the Russian worker feels no qualms in appropriating it. If he is apprehended, he regards it as mere misfortune, and goes off to serve his sentence of three to seven years. Nails, bits of metal, lumber, cloth, small hand tools and food are the chief items of theft, but personal property is also fair game. The bulk of these thefts are neither reported nor punished. Stealing minor items from the place of work for personal use is generally condoned, and supervisors are as guilty as the workers. As one of them put it, it is less bother to let a man steal a nail to fix his door, than to process a formal requisition for it. The general opinion on this question is: "Let them take it; it is theirs anyway. . . ."

Sex morality apparently poses no serious problems in the USSR. Children of the crowded Soviet homes are early aware of relations between the sexes. Facilities for birth control are generally available, and widely used, due to the difficult living conditions. Ardent Komsomolists and serious young people try to be "above such things," but extra-family living and the independence of women militate against abstemiousness. Premarital and extramarital relations are common, but do not constitute a factor of serious social disturbance. Homosexualism is severely punished in the Armed Forces, and is generally as vigorously disapproved among Russians as it is in the West.

Health and Skills

The Soviet people display a high level of health and physical fitness. As compared to the Japanese prisoners, they were much stronger, and more disease resistant. The Russian diet is plain but nutritious, and the work, though hard, is not exhausting. The eight-hour day is almost universal, and even prisoners rest on Sundays. Medical facilities, though limited, were available at all factories and labor camps mentioned in reports. Persons with more than two degrees fever were excused from work, and those with more than three degrees (101.4°F) were hospitalized. Patients with serious ailments were often hospitalized for several months. Soviet doctors were generally competent by Soviet and Japanese standards, but were often handicapped by shortages in drugs and medical supplies. Common colds, malaria and diarrhea were the most prevalent diseases in Eastern Siberia. Preventive medicine included periodic innoculaton for typhus, typhoid and smallpox, and clothing at labor camps were frequently boiled to kill typhus-bearing body lice. Private homes were well kept, and collective farms maintained reasonably good sanitary standards. The incidence of death from disease and accidents appeared to be low throughout Siberia. . . .

The Russian worker has great capacity for continued hard labor under extreme conditions, and through intensive efforts by the government to provide technically trained cadres, his efficiency and ability have improved steadily.

However, the Soviet skilled labor force is only about half as large as that of the United States, and the average factory worker is only one-fifth as productive. Lack of mechanization in industry is the chief reason for this, but the Soviet worker also tends to be wasteful of materials. His attitude is that there is always plenty of raw material, if he spoils a piece. He is also prone to work hard to accomplish his norm, and then stop, and he may forget to turn off the machinery in his haste to leave at quitting time. It is for this reason that the Soviet authorities raise the norm when the workers find means to surpass it regularly, or attempt to elicit a pledge from the workers to produce a given percent above norm The Soviet worker is inventive and resourceful in meeting practical problems under pressure, but pressure is required to get his best efforts. He is normally a willing worker, but may lay down his tools if "roughly spoken to" by his supervisor. Nor will he work if he is not paid. In several instances, pay was temporarily held up in various Siberian establishments, due to failure of the office staff to submit vouchers punctually, and the entire force refused to work until properly paid. If anyone was punished due to these short "strikes," it was normally the supervisor or the responsible administrator. There were no true strikes, in the sense of protests against increased norms, for wage increases, or for any other cause, and the workers showed no inclination to organize secretly.

The Force of Patriotism

Imbued with a fanatical devotion to their native land, the Russian people have never stinted in supporting the most oppressive of governments when attacked by foreign forces, and they develop this spirit more powerfully as the situation becomes desperate. . . .

Russian patriotism is both deep and pervasive. The ordinary Russian is proud of the vigorous climate, the great open spaces, and the historic rivers and mountains, and can be moved to tears by a poetic description of the birch trees along the Volga. He is proud of the vastness of his country, both geographically, and population-wise. He is proud of Russian literature, drama, music, and art. He is proud of Russian artists and inventors, and is at least half-ready to believe that Russians invented the radio, telephone and airplane. He is proud of his mellifluous (and intricate) Russian language. More recently, he has become proud of the fact his country has risen to become a primary world power, and official propaganda gives a heavy play to impressive statistics in this regard. Always powerful, pride of country has become a much more conscious force in recent years. The Communist Government at first attempted to dismiss these ideas as signs of petty provincialism, but soon discovered that this policy estranged the people. After expelling the internationalist (Trotsky) faction, the government soon surpassed all previous efforts in praise of the Russian culture and people The same will apply to any outsider who seeks to influence Russian thinking. To gain their sympathy, he must pay tribute to the deeply admired elements of Russian culture, and is well advised to express respect and admiration for the Russian peoples. . . .

The Soviet people are overwhelmingly unanimous in their boundless confidence in Soviet defensive capabilities. They reason that if the Soviet Union could single-handedly defeat the colossal German onslaught, demolish Germany as a military power, and break the back of Japan in a fortnight's foray, she is bound to win in any war. Neither the United States nor the other Western Powers are credited for their valiant and crucial role in World War II. Instead, they are vilified for having held off until the

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last moment, as the Communists put it, when it had become safe to rush in and share the spoils. . . .

Soviet people also have great confidence in the fighting ability of their individual soldiers. One Russian probably summarized the general view as follows: "One Russian is equal to five Japanese, two Americans or one German, and in the latter case, the Russian will usually win in the end, due to his advantage in ingenuity and persistence."

. . . Militarism is inherent in the theory and practice of Communism, and has permeated public attitudes toward the native land. The true Communist is, *ipso facto*, half soldier (or guerrilla). In the USSR, military exercises have become the daily bread, not only of 18 million Communists and Komsomolists, but also of the bulk of non-Communist Soviet youth. The sight of the soldier and the tools of war is both normal and acceptable to the Soviet citizen, who is convinced that the United States and her allies are plotting another war of aggression against his country. Militaristic attitudes are initiated in grade schools, where primers and arithmetic books invariably employ military illustrations. In secondary schools, all boys receive military training, and millions of Soviet youths who do not serve in the armed forces join training societies connected with the army, naval or air forces, in what amounts to a reserve training system. Millions of other citizens are enjoined to qualify for the "Labor and Defense" badge, by passing rather stringent tests in rifle marksmanship, grenade throwing, swimming, running and first aid. By 1940, nearly 20 million people had qualified. Through such devices, the Soviet people have become psychologically prepared for war at any time.

Russia Views the West

In the postwar period, the Soviet Government has adroitly blended the people's patriotism with a profound fear of a capitalist coalition to destroy the USSR. Love of country plus confidence in Soviet power have been complemented and reinforced by fear of attack and the conviction that capitalist nations live only to exterminate the Soviet people. "War-like" statements and threats by American military and political officials, and frequent American press items on atomic and other ultra-modern weapons are immediately reflected in the Soviet press to verify the rectitude of Communist foreign policy, and leave no shred of doubt in the USSR that the United States is preparing to attack. . . . The colossal Soviet effort to turn black into white appeared ludicrous to the informed peoples of the West, who saw the inadequate defense forces of Western countries dwarfed by the huge forces of the USSR, and were all too aware that every real threat to world peace from 1946 to 1951 was the direct result of Soviet machinations. However, it has long since convinced the people of the Soviet Union. In casual conversations with Japanese prisoners, many expressed dread in anticipating war with the United States, but none doubted that war would come. . . .

There is, however, an obverse side to the Soviet people's attitude which will steadily redound to the advantage of the United States, both in war and in peace. The keynote of this attitude is respect. The profound respect which the peoples, and in more recent decades, even the governments of Europe have accorded to the United States has long been pervasive in Russia. . . . Since the "hate America" campaign is largely a postwar development, the "admire America" campaign and the extremely favorable impressions of earlier years are still potentially dominant in the Russian mind. . . . It is not known to what extent the people would support large-scale Soviet military aggression outside the USSR. Heretofore, Soviet nationalism has been nourished on an almost morbid defense psychology. The nation has always been pictured as surrounded by powerful enemies under an eternal menace of invasion. There can be no doubt as to the power and speed of public support when the people feel their country is attacked. Therefore, it is extremely probable that a Soviet invasion of neighboring territory will be convincingly presented as a defensive response to enemy aggression. For several years, the Soviet Government has expended great labor to label the United States as a capitalistic aggressor nation. Any act by non-Communist countries which the government may choose to label as aggression will be directly imputed to the United States, since these countries are represented as mere American puppets. . . . Whatever the Soviet propaganda line for a war outside the USSR, the public probably would not rise spontaneously to the heights of heroism and sacrifice attained in World War II, but they would effectively and willingly support it. This support would be considerably more

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firm in efforts to defend or "liberate" neighboring Slav countries to the West, than in the case of countries in the Far East. . . .

Race—a Source of Strength

The Soviet Government has derived one marked political advantage from the Russians' lack of social and racial exclusiveness. In proselytizing for Communism among backward peoples, the Soviet political missionary is perfectly at ease with the poorest elements of the population, whether in Indo-China, Outer Mongolia or South Africa. By contrast, the French, British or American political representative is impelled to seek out the educated upper-class, or Westernized elements, and even then remains rather painfully conscious of the social gap. . . .

It is impossible to overstress the point that genuine inner conviction is the driving force of Communism. It is identical with the force which spread Christianity, Mohammedanism, and other religions over vast areas, and has little to do with real logic. Terror, riots and police control, so often the subject of Western criticism of Communism, are not employed to compel converts into the faith. They are employed by converts either to maintain or to establish a Communist form of government. Such criticisms may be effective, though usually in a passive sense, where the Communist threat is merely incipient, but are quite useless against the converts themselves, who see that such arguments attack only the method, and not the substance of Communism. . . .

Is the Regime Supported?

The primary Soviet attitude to the government is one of acceptance, generally without mental reservations. The idea of actively opposing the government on political questions is incomprehensible to the Soviet citizen. He has neither the means nor the inclination to develop organized criticism of the current regime; except as regards procedural matters on the lower levels. If permitted political freedom, the public presumably would produce variously oriented political parties of considerable vigor, since Russians readily develop a keen interest in public affairs, and there exists a de-

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finite variety of regional and economic interests. As matters stand, Soviet individuals can occasionally express politically divergent sentiments in private conversations at no great risk of prosecution, but independent group discussions are impossible, due to the MGB's universal informant net, and to the fact that unfavorable remarks would be severely punished. It is similarly out of the question to publish materials criticizing the Communist regime, since it is a serious offense to possess duplicating machines without specific authorization and control. The Soviet citizen understands and accepts these effectively enforced limitations without undue psychological strain. He is irritated, but in general, critical and hostile attitudes never get beyond the stage of private opinion, and therefore are almost never crystallized into a program of action.

Where organized opposition does occur, it is immediately punished and publicized as treason against the Soviet people. Retribution is directed against a small segment of the population, carefully and convincingly relabeled as "decadent bourgeois elements," "reactionary Kulak (rich peasant) remnants," "enemy-inspired saboteurs and wreckers," or as "hirelings and spies of the capitalist aggressors." Victims usually confess at great length in open court, removing all public doubt as to the truth of the charge. Although he resents the MVD system, the average man feels that there is no threat to his own security, and is inclined to applaud the diligence of the security agencies in rooting out subversive elements. . . .

National leaders are widely respected and admired but the prevailing public attitude is relatively free of emotion. Neither affection nor hostility is expressed, but their sincerity and ability are generally unquestioned. Maladministration is blamed on intermediate officials, and poor living conditions are expected to improve with the expansion of production. . . . Contrary to Western belief, there appears to be little public antipathy toward any of the top Communist leaders. . . .

The vast difference in the proportion of "Communists" in the USSR, as compared with the United States must be taken into account in assessing the Soviet people's attitude. Individuals directly connected with the Communist Party through membership in the party, the Komsomol or the Pioneers are so numerous that every Russian is personally acquainted with several of them. The ratio of the aggregate of members to non-members in the general population is about one to 12 in rural areas and one to five in urban areas. The USSR is ruled by a few hundred party members in the highest echelon of government. The great mass of party-affiliated people are distinguishable from the general public only in their more intense indoctrination and in their somewhat immediate liability to government and party control. There is no apparent friction or ill-feeling between the two groups. The attitude of the adult non-member, even when mildly anti-Communist, is necessarily tempered by the fact that he has several Communist-affiliated members in his immediate family and circle of friends, and may well have been a member of one or both junior organizations for several years during his childhood. In the United States the ratio of Communists and Communist sympathizers to the urban population is about one to 500. Most Americans are fortunate enough never to have knowingly had personal contact with a professed Communist. In the USSR the Communist is a patriot, a civic booster and frequently a war hero, doing his best to build up his country. In the United States the Communist is at best a fool, and at worst a traitor, whose primary aim is to destroy his country. Communists in the USSR enjoy public admiration, while those in the United States are justly condemned as actual or potential felons. Even a well-informed American has great difficulty in understanding how a Russian could fail to share his revulsion toward Communists, and the Russian is equally incredulous at the American attitude. Therefore, the American critic must strive to understand the extreme contrast between the two viewpoints, if he hopes to influence the Soviet people. To be intelligible to Russians, criticisms must not be directed against Communists generally, but against various Communist beliefs and against specific malpractices of the Communist Government.

It is extremely difficult to determine the attitude of the millions of convicts and ex-convicts who have received or served three- to 20-year sentences in the forced labor camps. Without attempting to analyze the vague data on numbers, it may be assumed that the convict population has averaged not less than 10 million since 1930, and that the average sentence is 5 years. On this basis, 40 million should have completed sentence by 1950, of which about half have been permanently settled in Siberia. This agrees with the Japanese prisoner estimates that about half of the free population in Siberia are ex-convicts. Incidentally, Japanese prisoners were unable to confirm stories of atrocious conditions and high death rates in the labor camps. Working in the same factories with prisoners of war and free workers, the convicts appear to have had the same fairly effective medical care. Moreover, the convicts applied themselves only when the factory manager was present, sneaked off to take naps when opportunity offered, and often advised the Japanese to work more slowly, to keep the norm from rising. There was no suggestion that they were undernourished or physically mistreated. Nearly all Japanese prisoners believed that the convicts were "against the Regime" but the only specific complaint by the convicts was that their sentence was too long for what they did. Nearly all convicts who talked to the Japanese expressed this resentment, and many said they hoped there would soon be a war between the US and the USSR, because they would then be released to join the armed forces without having to serve their sentence. No one expressed the hope or the belief that the USSR would be defeated in such a war, nor was there any indication of anti-Soviet movements among the convicts. . . .

The Soviet soldier is basically a Soviet citizen in uniform. He shares the same attitudes, beliefs and response patterns, though these are modified and elaborated by more intensive indoctrination and training. In joining the military service, he is fulfilling an old childhood ambition. He is gratified by the universal admiration and respect accorded a soldier in the USSR. He has argued the relative merits of service in artillery, tank forces, air, and navy since his early school days, and is thoroughly predisposed to develop a great pride in the service of his choice. . . .

The Soviet soldier develops typical "GI" attitudes after he has completed two or three years of service. He will complain about army food, pay, promotions, and place of service. Some soldiers serving in Siberia said that the strict discipline of army life was more difficult than that of civilians, but in the prevailing opinion the army was a welcome relief from the unremitting pressure of

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labor norms in the factories. . . .

Regarding health, stamina and native intelligence, the Soviet soldier is neither better nor worse than other European soldiers. Basically healthy through a sound diet and hard work, the Soviet recruit acquires much of his stamina from rigorous training, and from a mental acclimatization to high standards of individual performance. The old Suvorov doctrine, "Hard on the training ground, easy on the battlefield," is readily understood and accepted. In his patience, ingenuity and initiative, the Soviet soldier was fully comparable to the well-trained German troops in World War II, and prejudicial German descriptions of him as "stupid, fatalistic, immune to suffering, and indifferent to death" were far more unjust to the German forces who had to meet him in battle than they were to the Soviet troops. On the other hand, inordinate Allied praise for the valor and zeal of Soviet troops, as exemplified in the epic battles of Moscow, Kiev, Sevastopol and Stalingrad, has led to the erroneous impression of an almost superhuman Soviet fighting man. It must be stressed that in his human characteristics, innate ability and basic psychological endowment, the Soviet soldier differs little, if at all, from the average European soldier. Insofar as his performance on the battlefield is unique, it must be accounted for by differences in environment, training, and indoctrination.

How the Soldiers Feel

The Soviet soldier is, of course, inured to the extremes of Russian weather, and need not be taught how to keep warm in winter. Nor is daily existence in the field a serious problem, for most Russians were born on the farm, and performed their first regular labor there. Being used to what we would call a low standard of consumption, the Soviet soldier enjoys better food, clothing, and shelter in the Soviet Armed Forces than he knew as a civilian. In most cases he has his first direct contact with trucks, radios, telephones, and other interesting mechanical equipment in the army. Since he enjoys a higher status and better living conditions in the service than in civilian life, the adjustment is stimulating rather than painful, and he is generally well disposed toward it.

The Soviet soldier is fully acclimated to group living. Since privacy and the opportunity to be individualistic are unknown to him, he finds little difference in the communal life of the soldier, and readily adopts a group orientation in the service. The practical significance of this easy sociability is twofold. First, it speeds the process of forming, expanding, and training small units. Recruits readily fall into place in any desired organization pattern. Due to their positive attitude to the members of the group, ideas and techniques rapidly diffuse through the unit, and largely compensate for relative Soviet disadvantages in formal education. The soldier's practice of throwing himself wholeheartedly into all activities of his group is not articulated as an ideal; it is a habit. Thus, the esprit de corps achieved only with considerable effort in Western armies is present in a Soviet unit almost from its inception. Second, there is little difficulty arising from clashes of personality, or "problem children," in the Soviet forces. As was stated above, personal differences are speedily resolved, usually in a very heated argument. Once resolved, adjustment is usually permanent and relations remain cordial. The Soviet infantry company commander gets more than his share of dull-normal (above moron level), illiterate, and non-Russian-speaking recruits, but he is not troubled by the immature, the psychopathic personality, and the "mama's boy" types—all of which develop through insufficient group contacts. Therefore, he probably has a net advantage over his harried counterpart in the West, particularly under the stress of war. The substandard Soviet recruit may require a great deal of patience and attention from his noncommissioned officers, but he is usually susceptible to individual and group pressure, and once trained, he will function efficiently and dependably within his limited scope.

Why the Soldiers Fight

Deeply ingrained in the Russian personality is the *nechevo* attitude. It is a centuries-old inheritance of habitual self-discipline which sustains the Soviet soldier, as well as the civilian, in time of war, or in any other difficult circumstance. In this usage it may be translated "it's nothing at all," though in answering direct personal queries, the Russian will use it to indicate that everything is all right. It symbolizes the Russian habit of accepting what must be accepted, without undue inner turmoil, and enables the soldier to preserve his good humor through toil, privation, and disappointment. It operates as a cushion against psychological shock. Thus the Russian may become temporarily embittered, or display great emotion for a short time, but he soon reverts to normal, and accepts the new situation with a minimum of friction. Moreover, successive shocks are only slightly cumulative in effect. The Soviet soldier does not "store up" insults, disappointments, defeats and disasters. While his training accentuates the positive aspect of his situation, he has his own mechanism for "decentuating" the negative aspects. Thus, if Soviet troops withstand the first shock of an assault, they are likely to evince an indefatigable solidarity in facing successive assaults. In the offense, they are capable of renewing the attack indefinitely, if they are not over-awed at the very start by the power and determination of the enemy's response. By the same token, the soldier endures repeated forced marches, carries out two-day infiltration operations in the midst of hostile troops, or goes on half-rations for days on end, without suffering any severe decline in morale.

The *nechevo* attitude sustains the unit, as well as the individual, but it is the unit which receives virtually all emphasis. Praise and censure are more often accorded to a unit than to an individual. Even individual awards are prized in good part because they confer additional status on the unit. Deaths of individuals in battle are more easily accepted through primary emphasis on the unit, which no one regards as mortal. In conformity with this attitude, the Soviet unit of replacement was the regiment or division, not the individual. This marked cultural trait of "groupism" (as opposed to individualism) accounts for the Soviet soldier's ability to carry on in spite of heavy losses. Consequently a Soviet unit, from a squad or gun crew up to an army, may hold a hopelessly isolated position for days and weeks after the main battle line has passed to its rear, and having become well established in such a position, is likely to fight until the last of its firing points is destroyed. . . .

The intensity of Soviet training, backed up by a system of fairly stringent punishments and effective rewards, has developed a habit of obedience and an unreasoning confidence in the Soviet fighting man. Never having had any

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alternative to obedience, he is long habituated to carrying out orders. Having always carried out orders, he is confident that all orders can be carried out. If the orders are sufficiently flexible to admit of several solutions, he has enough ingenuity to work out a good, practical solution which is well adapted to the circumstances. If the orders are too specific, however, he will carry them out to the letter. In a sense this may be called good discipline, but over-precise and impossible orders have often robbed the soldier of the opportunity to exploit his experience and intimate knowledge of the situation, and have forfeited whole units needlessly. . . .

What the Soldiers Think

The intense indoctrination of the Soviet citizen and soldier is primarily Communist in content, though it has an extended superstructure of distorted information on current events, economics and Soviet policy. Its influence is moderately strong in the below-40 brackets, and amounts to an obsession among the 16 million Communist Party and Young Communist League members. In the Armed Forces, Communist indoctrination is more intensive and more uniformly strong than among parallel civilian groups. Operating in an intellectual vacuum, Communism exercises a strong appeal of optimism, progress and righteousness, which is incomprehensible to the more cultivated peoples of the West. Even the less receptive of the Soviet soldiers are vaguely but firmly convinced that Communism is "right," and the active Communists are certain that it is the key to world progress, prosperity and peace. To the well-indoctrinated soldier, anti-Communist nations are not only the mortal enemies of his country; they are also the enemies of "justice," "science" and "advancement." The military and morale importance of this is twofold. First, it adds to the ordinary soldier's already strong patriotic incentive to win. Second, it supports the unreasoning fanaticism of the ardent Communists, who spark-plug Soviet military units down to platoon level. The latter constitute a strong factor in the strength and cohesiveness of the Soviet military unit. There is no mistaking the genuineness of their appeal, for they do not merely give advice and encouragement from the deep rear. As ordinary soldiers and squad leaders in combat, they regularly set a superb example of bravery and skill during World War II. Political officers of battalion, regiment and division level regularly joined in the worst of the fighting, and Party members suffered such disproportionate casualties that it became a serious problem to find suitably trained and experienced replacements for them. . . .

Communist indoctrination has convinced both civilians and servicemen that the Soviet Army is the finest on earth, and that it is the nation's great bulwark against a hostile, wicked world. As a result, the popular Soviet attitude to the military is virtually the reverse of that prevailing in the West. The Army is a revered institution, and the object of pride and devotion. The people are never critical of the army, or of defense expenditure. In wartime, the slogan is "Everything for the front," and in peace, "Everything needful for the Armed Forces!" Consequently there is very little resentment of military training or military service. Even today, the Communist hierarchy could probably put an end to public resentment against high norms and low incomes, if the sacrifice were justified as essential to national defense and a powerful army. . . . Soviet leaders will stress this theme to the utmost when war comes, and economic privation will immediately disappear as a psychological warfare target, because those who remain civilians are proud to contribute to the war effort by working hard and by doing without.

In war, the nation stresses the victories and defeats of units, not of individuals. There is little, if any, mention of the individual soldier's privations and suffering, and hardly any reference to casualties. Public attitudes do not invite the Soviet soldier to pity himself, or to brood on the possibility of death. Instead, he is presumed to be personally responsible for defeating the enemy. The slogan in World War II was, "Death to the Invader!" and "Kill Him, Kill Him!" Stalin's message to troops in the Battle of Moscow conformed fully with public feeling: "The enemy is destroying your country. If you don't stop him, nobody stops him." The soldier's job was not to defend himself or his buddies, or to avoid death, but to kill and defeat the enemy. The same negative attitude toward casualties carried over to the civilian population. Wives and mothers on the homefront normally were never informed of the soldier's death or injuries, and military units did not burden themselves by keeping permanent records of those lost in battle. His family knew of his condition only when the serviceman came home on a hospital furlough or medical discharge. If he returned home after the war, his family was grateful for his good fortune. If not, he was presumed dead. In this case, certitude could come only gradually, and the adjustment, though painful, was made without any devastating shock. This technique for accepting what comes permitted a remarkable resilience and steadiness in the civilian as well as the military elements.

"Facing up to the situation" was another technique of indoctrination which had a galvanizing effect in wartime. Unlike the perpetual optimist in the German propaganda office, or the matter-of-fact British commentator, the Kremlin propagandist stressed the vital importance of the coming battle, the deadly consequences if the new line were broken, and the need for greater efforts than had yet been made. . . . Every situation was presented as a stern challenge, demanding the maximum exertion from everyone. As a result of this aggressive psychological fixation, and a keen sense of personal responsibility, the Soviet soldier was able to continue fighting in spite of heavy casualties, and to muster even greater determination as the situation deteriorated. If the Soviet propaganda machine operates unmolested, he will react similarly in crises of the future.

Appealing to the Russians

The Soviet Union is a fairly difficult psychological target. The people are extremely patriotic, and tend to approve of the present government, because it has made Russia a world power, and was able to defeat the Germans. Government control of all propaganda media makes it extremely hard to reach the people from outside the country. On the other hand, the Soviet people gossip freely, tend to be hypercritical on a personal basis, and like to grumble about the petty irritations of daily life. Moreover, for all their superficial antipathy, they have a deep admiration for the United States, are susceptible to humanitarian ideals, and eagerly accept new facts from foreign sources, if they appear reasonable.

Propaganda will be effective if it stresses the unfairness of government policies which the Soviet people really

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think unfair. For example, it would be extremely effective to base criticisms on the killing pace of Stakhanovite production norms, inadequate wage levels, high prices, and the poor quality of consumer goods, because all are within the immediate ken of the average Russian. He has been complaining about them for years. In all cases, generalizations should be well supported with concrete examples, to establish an undeniably factual tie-in to the citizen's own experience. For example, one pair of low-quality shoes per year is a poor reward for a man who wears them out trying to accomplish an impossible work norm, and it is more unjust to require his children to get along with still less. In attacking the convict labor system, criticism should be directed against specific inequalities and injustices, rather than against the system in general. The Russian understands that lawbreakers must be punished, and that the Soviet system fulfills a necessary function in this. Moreover, he may be convinced that Soviet jurisprudence is more "merciful" than that of the West, regarding many crimes of violence. But he does feel that a six-year sentence is far too much for stealing a sack of potatoes, particularly when he knows that the manager of his factory is stealing lumber and bricks by the truckload. Russians generally are indifferent to the "corrective labor" sentences imposed on thousands of "reactionaries" in territories newly acquired during World War II. They have the same hostile attitude toward "wreckers, spies and traitors," as Americans have toward Communists who are imprisoned in the United States, but many Russians undoubtedly have close relatives or friends who were unjustly or too severely punished for "lack of vigilance," and other political "crimes." Only the most flagrant and obvious cases can be exploited, however, because political opposition, criticism, and discussion, long cherished as inviolable rights in Britain and the United States, have always been acknowledged as felonies in the Russian State.

Various Soviet fiscal operations are vulnerable to propaganda attack. The most immediate in the mind of the Soviet worker is the semi-obligatory government bond subscription, which is launched several times each year. Workers frequently express keen resentment against these forced savings, and do not regard them as a real asset, since they cannot redeem the bond prior to its maturity (normally 10 years), except by proving a case of extreme hardship at the bank. Ruble devaluations are extremely unjust in many individual cases, though most people have too little cash laid by to be affected. The aggrieved persons, however, are exceptionally vulnerable to the influence of hostile propaganda for several months after a general devaluation. Most vulnerable of all is the huge Soviet turnover tax. . . . Effective propaganda on the subject would certainly generate popular discontent, and might force the government to make costly adjustments in its fiscal and economic control system.

Housing is also the source of much discontent in the Soviet Union, and the government would probably be forced to make some adjustments in response to criticism for its failure to provide adequate facilities. . . .

The most profitable avenue of propaganda approach merges into the field of political leadership. For more than a century, the Russian people have been very susceptible to political ideas. The surge of political idealism undermined the Czarist autocracy, furnished the means for the rise of Communism, and remains a potentially invincible challenge to the oppressive system which emerged as the Soviet Government. Today, although poorly educated in other respects, the peoples of the Soviet Union are keenly alert to political and social problems. Permitted to see only the official, Communist side of the picture, they are nonetheless prepared by intensive political training to understand and adopt the democratic ideals of a free society.

The counter-revolutionary leaders in the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) failed to gain public support largely because they offered no convincing political program. The German Government alienated public sympathy in World War II when its actions and policies belied earlier promises of democracy and independence. In the event of World War III the Allied Powers, and particularly the United States will have to dispel the recently established Soviet myths of American brutality, greed, and callousness. From the start, they must use every means in their power to reach the people with an attractive, detailed, and practicable political program. Immediately exploitable is the farmer's hunger for his own land. The agricultural population would be strongly attracted by the prospect of privately owned farms, and the right to sell their own produce on a free market. Industrial workers would be similarly attracted by the prospect of having a voice in wages, production quotas, and working conditions, the right to organize truly independent labor unions, and the right to choose their habitat and place of employment. All elements of the population would respond to the promise of personal freedom, and the right to travel in their own country without official restrictions. Of less immediate appeal but capable of development, are the democratic rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom from arbitrary arrest, search, and seizure, and the right to organize political parties and to hold genuine elections. Considerable time and energy would be required to achieve widespread understanding and support for these relatively abstract rights, since the peoples of the USSR at present have little knowledge of them.

Army Report on Siberia

The promise of independence for national minority groups is only partially exploitable, because support gained within such groups would be offset by alienation of the many people who would see it as a threat to dismember their country. The plebiscite principle would certainly get a mixed reception; the Union forces fought very bitterly in the American Civil War, just to prevent such "self-determination." However, a fair-minded proposal to consider the desires of minority peoples, and to provide at least a greater degree of local autonomy in a federal framework probably would be well received. In any case, the people should be assured that all predominantly Russian groups would be included in the Russian state, which would be assured its rightful and equal place among the free nations of the world.

The peoples of the USSR are also susceptible to ideals of international cooperation, and to the principles of the United Nations. The employment of this powerful lever in the Korean War has already compelled the Soviet Communists to attempt retaliation with the "World Peace Council" and the idea of the "Peoples Democracies." Both devices can profitably be exposed for what they are. In the event of World War III, the Western Powers, fighting under the aegis of the United Nations, could employ the best of psychological weapons by promising to deliver the Russian people from the control of a radical minority, and to restore all political

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power in the Russian state to the people, and to their freely elected representatives. Whatever the program adopted, it must provide the fullest scope for Russian patriotism and Russian self-respect within the framework of the Allied war effort, and the indoctrination effort should be second only to the more urgent military requirements.

Influencing the Soldiers

The Soviet soldier is a much more difficult target, but he too can be reached. Whether openly or secretly, he will read everything he gets from foreign sources. Credible propaganda will pass readily through the ranks by word of mouth. He will be tremendously impressed with American military equipment, and with cheap personal possessions which the American soldier takes as a matter of course. It is possible to weaken many of his beliefs, as in the disgrace of surrender, the superiority of Soviet equipment, and the skill of his superiors. Regarding surrender, he can be persuaded that it is foolish to squander his life in a hopeless situation, when he can continue to serve his country after the war. . . .

Of course, the best way to destroy the morale of Soviet troops is to defeat them repeatedly in combat. To accomplish this, due cognizance must be accorded their strengths and weaknesses. Inexperienced units were terrorized and reduced to panic with relative ease in World War II, but little advantage accrued if they were allowed simply to retreat and restore themselves. Large contingents surrounded in wide enveloping attacks (the German pincer technique) were captured in several instances by the hundreds of thousands; but if allowed any respite, surrounded groups were reorganized, and fought in place to the last man. Panic is normally induced by the old principle of overwhelming forces at the main points of attack. The artillery and air preparation should be as impressive and as deadly as it is possible to make it, and the attack should follow just as the psychological shock effect has reached its peak. The point of maximum mental strain is yet to be determined, but troops under prolonged bombardment eventually relax, and thereafter are able to face an attack with great determination. All attacks should be planned as rapid double envelopments, to assure complete destruction of the enemy forces, preferably by capture, in the earliest stages of their disorganization. Soviet troops in this condition often surrender quite readily, and destruction of enemy forces by capture is by far the most economical in casualties among friendly forces. . . .

In wartime the Soviet soldier is too young, too thoroughly indoctrinated, and too immediately concerned with the practical requirements of combat to respond to the more elaborate abstractions of political and moral propaganda. It would be sufficient merely to assure him that his loved ones in occupied areas were safe; that the Allied Powers were restoring adequate living conditions, schools, and public services there without delay; and that Russia would be a free democratic country after the war. "News from home" concerning developments in occupied Russian towns would be particularly welcome to Soviet troops and commanders would find it virtually impossible to prevent the troops' reading such leaflets. The Soviet soldier will also accept the "life insurance" implicit in the safe-conduct leaflet, at least to the extent of making sure he has one. . . . German propaganda often strove to torment and irritate the soldier and only succeeded in reinforcing his hostility, since this is what he expected from a vicious enemy. A kindly tone, on the other hand, would tend to discount Soviet atrocity stories and would generate serious doubts as to whether the Allied Powers held any real antipathy for the Russian people. The soldier could then take a more reasonable view on the question of surrender, the reliability of Allied news items, and the sincerity of political assurances. The important thing is to gain the soldier's attention and to influence his thinking. How far he can be influenced remains to be established, but his alertness and interest make him amenable to propaganda efforts and to new ideas.

Understanding the Citizens

The American viewpoint of life in the Soviet Union remains valid in all essentials. The Soviet citizen enjoys neither the liberty nor the civil rights which we cherish and insist upon as the natural endowment of all men. The "free" worker in the USSR is as much chained to his job and local area as is the convict. He has no voice in determining his place of work, working conditions, or wages. His only advantage over the convict is that he can live with his family and can spend his limited income as he sees fit. He has no redress against a harsh authoritarian government. He is forbidden to raise his voice in criticism, to develop independent views, or to acquire unbiased information. His voting rights are a travesty on the ideals and purposes of democracy. He enjoys no acknowledged rights for his person, life, or property. He is the helpless prisoner of a slave state. As was noted previously, such an existence would be intolerable for Americans. American traditions and beliefs militate against every facet of government activity in the USSR. British and American Communist sympathizers who visit the USSR nearly always return in bitter disillusionment. There is no better antidote for radicalism.

The Russian, however, is habituated to all aspects of his environment. He has no information on British or American political theory and has little concept of what life could be like in a free society. Most of the Soviet police controls and limitations on movement were previously employed in the czarist regime. An undercurrent of discontent has always been manifest; otherwise, stringent controls would not be necessary. But the people in general, like the people of other low-income countries, have long been adjusted to their living conditions. Similarly they have learned to live within the stern limitations imposed by their government. Habitually a cheerful, optimistic people, they make the best of their situation and are primarily concerned with the immediate, practical considerations of daily living. They enjoy family life and social activities within their circle of friends. They remain patriotic and proud of their national accomplishments.

In the event of a general war, it will become the mission of the free people of the West to overcome the menace of Communism and to reorient the victimized peoples of the USSR and other Communist nations. To do so will require an unbiased understanding both of the position and outlook of the average Soviet citizen. It has been the purpose of this study to demonstrate the contrast between the typically Russian and American concepts of life in the USSR and to render the average Russian's viewpoint sufficiently intelligible to provide the basis for a sound psychological approach to the peoples and fighting men of the Soviet Union.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

A "Liberal" Civilization Wrecked by War

by Gilbert Murray

I SAW some time ago a letter from a woman, a cultivated and liberal-minded woman, who had been some years in prison, first Nazi and then Communist, where she was kept without books, till at last by some special grace a friend was allowed to send her some. Among the books was a Thucydides. She read the Funeral Speech of Pericles about Athens and almost wept; that was the sort of city which recalled the ideals of her youth, not like any city remaining in Europe as it now is. Of course, the Funeral Speech is not meant to be a perfectly objective or matter-of-fact account; it is an old man's picture of the days of his youth. It was written by Thucydides after the fall of Athens, to try to show people what the Beloved City really had been in the time of her greatness under her greatest leader. There may well be some idealization, but it is not at all the ideal that would suit present-day Berlin or Moscow; nor yet, ancient Sparta, nor Rome, nor Babylon nor Jerusalem. It is modern and—in the strict sense of the word—Liberal—"fit for a Free Man," without fear or hatred or inward slavery.

Pericles begins by explaining that Athens is called a democracy, because the government is in the hands of the many, not of the few. The law secures equal justice for all; but that does not mean that men are all on a dead level. Some are better than others, and those who excel in any way are more esteemed and honored. There are rewards and privileges for real merit, but not for mere rank or wealth. Poverty is never a bar: the poorest citizen has the right to take part in the Assembly and try to make his contribution to the guidance of his country. Again, life is free. No one in his private life is frowned at, or treated with intolerance if he chooses to live in a way different from the common. In public life, Athenians are restrained from doing wrong not by force or threats of force, but by a general spirit of respect for the laws, especially those laws that bring protection to the injured or helpless, and the unwritten laws of decency and honor which are felt by good men but not enforced by any statute. "We Athenians have happy lives," says Pericles. "All the riches of the earth flow into Athens through our widespread commerce. We provide leisure, not mere idleness, for the overtired." The whole style of Athenian life is refined, and a general interest in art and culture serves to drive dullness away. "Our military training may in various ways be better than that of our neighbors, but we never exclude foreigners or try to prevent their seeing or learning things that might be useful to them. Our City throws itself open to the world." (There was no "Iron curtain"; no perpetual fear of neighboring cities, no plotting against them.)

"The Athenians love beauty, but have not luxurious tastes; they cultivate the mind without any loss of manliness." As to wealth, of course it is useful for many good purposes; but it is not with us a thing to boast about or to display. No one in Athens need be ashamed of being poor, unless indeed his poverty is due to lack of industry and good work—then he well may be. Unlike other cities, Athens expects every citizen to take an interest in public affairs; and, as a matter of fact, most Athenians have some sense of public affairs. We believe in the value of knowledge as a guide to action: we have a power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas many peoples can be full of energy if they do not think, but when they reflect begin to hesitate. We make friends abroad by doing good and giving help to our neighbors; and we do this not from some calculation of self-interest but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. "I would have you fix your eyes upon Athens day by day, contemplate her potentiality; not merely what she is but what she has the power to be, until"—the phrase is even stronger in Greek than in English—"until you become her Lovers. Reflect that her glory has been built up by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it. Make them your examples and learn from them that the secret of Happiness is Freedom, and the secret of Freedom, Courage."

That, as Thucydides' memory paints the picture, is what Athens in her flower once was, Athens before the Great War or—as the last phrase seems to show—at the start of the Great War. It was a free and happy city, simple in daily life but rich in culture and thought, tolerant at home and open and unsuspicious in its dealings abroad. No doubt the picture is idealized; but the striking point is the kind of ideal that is aimed at, an ideal not quite like that of any other civilization between that time and our own nineteenth or twentieth century. It was a Liberal civilization: free, tolerant and unprejudiced; highly cultured; and out of its abundance generous and helpful to the rest of mankind.

But the Great War had begun, and Thucydides describes unsparingly its effects—in the hope, he says, that his account may possibly be of use to statesmen of later times, if by chance a situation of the same sort should ever occur again. War, he says, takes away that abundance and leaves no room for generosity. War is a violent schoolmaster: it educates men in doing violence to one another.

The war of which he speaks was on a great scale. It lasted on, it became more bitter, and it spread farther and farther. It became what we now call ideological: a war of revolutionary against conservative or, more nakedly, of poor against rich, or merely of clique against clique, irrespective of right and wrong. There were "fifth columns" all over Greece; there were civil wars, hidden or open, everywhere. After ten years there came not exactly peace, but at least a great frustrated effort at peace, frustrated by the various wrongs and grievances created by the war itself and clamoring for a second and worse war to set them right. War, all in all, for twenty-seven years, with civil wars in its train.

And what effect has it all on that high, free-minded, liberal civilization of Athens? Thucydides tells us. The whole Hellenistic world, he tells us, was shaken, every part of it being divided

This essay is an excerpt from Mr. Murray's new book, HELLENISM AND THE MODERN WORLD (Beacon; cloth, $1.50; paper, $.75).

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between the partisans of one or other of the two great cities. "Civil war," he says, more pervasive of daily life and consequently more treacherous and cruel than other war, "led to every form of wickedness throughout Greece." At each new crisis men strove to outbid their opponents "by the ingenuity of their intrigues and the atrocity—the word is literally 'the unthinkableness' or 'unguessableness'—of their revenges." Revenge became dearer to men than self-preservation. All moral values were transformed. Violence, frantic energy, successful treachery, were the things applauded; prudence, moderation, good faith suspected and despised. Party feeling was stronger than any bond of family or affection. (Children, I suppose, betrayed or denounced their fathers.) "That simplicity which is so large an element in nobility of nature, was laughed out of existence." The root cause of it all was the wish for "domination," the unlimited craving for Power. We hear perhaps of no atrocities in Athens itself, but there was a lowering of all standards. In home politics power fell into the hands of "the most violent of the citizens"; towards other communities Athens too fell a victim to this lust for power, "the wicked harlot who makes city after city in love with her, to betray them one after another to their ruin."

Thucydides expounds its principles in an imaginary dialogue between the corrupted Athenians of the later war time, and their victims in the neutral island of Melos. The Melians have committed no offence, but their island would be useful to Athens. The Melians appeal to law, to established custom, to justice, to man's regard for the gods; the Athenians explain frankly that such considerations are of no account to them; it is only Power that matters. They use their power, conquer Melos, kill the men, sell the women and children into slavery, and therewith —the historian grimly adds—they set off triumphant on the fatal expedition against Sicily which is to leave imperial Athens in the dust.

The great liberal Hellenic civilization failed to get rid of war, and war was able to destroy it—by inward poison as well as by outward violence. Thucydides was perhaps not so far wrong when he thought that his history might be of some use to statesmen of later ages if the same sort of situation should ever occur again.

Crime and Chicane

AN ACTRESS FRIEND of mine whose origins will immediately be obvious, once in dudgeon told a producer: "I will certainly not play a whore," only to add after a moment's thought: "unless it's an O'Casey whore." So shall I say hereafter: I certainly will not read a gangster story—unless it's a Simenon gangster.

The Brothers Rico is one of three novels comprising *Tidal Wave,* Georges Simenon's first book with an American setting, and it is about gangsters. The brothers have been members since boy-

Tidal Wave, by Georges Simenon (Doubleday; $3.95).

hood of an organization which has operatives throughout the country and an oligarchy upon whose protection depends the survival of even the petty bourgeoisie of the gang. (Nothing so distinguishes the American gangster apparently as his exaggerations of our social values.) If I have used words which have political overtones, it is because in reading *The Brothers Rico,* I said to myself: here is the sort of man on whom totalitarianism rises whether in gangdom or in government; he has not been deprived of his individuality, he has foresworn it. Eddie Rico cannot think except in terms of his position in the organization. He does not want to think in other terms. He may despise the men above him but he will no more question their authority than he will the hour of the sun's rising. He is not a killer, but he accepts killings as a necessary evil. He is a family man, he has tested his favor in the community by joining the country club. He has faith, if you will, in the corruptibility of all men. He is completely corroded by "security," by "belonging." Portrait of an American gangster.

The allegory was of my finding. Mr. Simenon would surely disavow it. He simply writes of the human heart, and of one heart at a time. Take from his exposures what we will, he essays no comment. He probes and we discover. What a revelation of America is in *Tidal Wave! Belle,* the first novel of the collection, could scarcely have occurred elsewhere than in a New England of pride and reticences, where secrets of oneself are kept even from oneself; *The Brothers Rico* are ours, God help us; and *The Bottom of the Bottle* could be reached only amongst a group of people who, if they had a culture might be decadent, but who without it are merely dissolute.

So, Simenon has discovered America: our flavor, our prejudices, our foibles. So much does he seem a part of us in *Tidal Wave,* only his overfondness for hot dogs reveals him as a convert.

What remains now is for America to discover Simenon. There is no one quite like him writing today, although I am sometimes reminded in his novels of Hemingway in his short stories. There is the same terseness, the same lean, lithe drama to which the dialogue is integral, never merely illustrative, and the same pitiless slash to the heart of the matter. He may sometimes be accused of telling too little, never of telling too much.

He has written over three hundred and fifty novels and it is an ironic likelihood that had he written less he would be held in higher esteem, not because the fewer books would have been better done, but because certain critics cannot believe that so prolific a writer can possibly understand the stuff whereof great books are made. André Gide once suggested that he was perhaps the greatest of contemporary French novelists, but by and large, his most generous critics expect a great book of him one day. Some even say he might have written a great book if. . . . I am wondering if he has not already written it, perhaps as long ago as *The Man Who Watched the Trains Go By.*

It will be interesting to see if Simenon can come home to America, as it were. Whether he is writing novels without detection or novels about his Inspector Maigret, he is what we would call a crime writer and we, unfortunately, have relegated our crime and mystery writers to a sort of second-class citizenship. I do not mean to imply that some writing in the field is not second-rate or worse, but such is true of all fiction, and this limbo of letters is a very lonely place in which to try to write a good book. The mystery writer matters not enough, it seems, to get real hell, and his chance for paradise awaits the coming of a new messiah. Perhaps Simenon is he.

Perhaps he will bring us an American equivalent of his Inspector Maigret, an amiable and competent cop who is likely to more resemble Joe Friday than say, Ellery Queen. And here the estimable Simenon will have something to learn from us. Neither Joe nor Ellery would dare take a step without apprising his

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audience of it. Maigret has a nasty habit of going back into the murder house after telling his reader he is going home to bed.

But it is not in the matter of detection that mystery writers are looking to be led out of limbo. Their exile has been worse confounded by the company of bawds and sadists to whom Shakespeare was a jerk, Poe a drip, and even Sam Spade a lily.

These are the boys with whom Simenon must tilt, however scornful of the proposition his devotees may be. Of all the books of mystery and crime bought in America each year, far and away the greatest seller amongst them is Mickey Spillane. If the number of his addicts is an unhappy phenomenon, there is yet an unhappier one. These people read. How many Americans buy no books at all?

Nor is it preposterous to suppose that Simenon can wean the Spillane addicts. Both are concerned with the ultimate in human excess. The difference—if I may be permitted for argument to except the enormous distinction of a writer from a semantic hatchetman—lies in the philosophical approach to the excess. Simenon seems to be saying, "There but for the grace of God go I," while Spillane would say: "There, by God, go I." Spillane goes from excess to excess, Simenon from paucity to excess. Simenon will show why some men turn bestial. Spillane proposes that all men are beasts. I belabor this odious comparison because I do believe that the salvation of crime fiction lies in its honest illumination of human darknesses. For this we may need a Diogenes with his lantern, but not a Wotan with a flame thrower.

If Simenon does preside over the rise and survival of the mystery, it will be incidental to his purpose, of course, which is nothing more than the discovery of the greatest variety of human experience—and getting paid for the discovery. DOROTHY SALISBURY DAVIS

Gift of Prophesy

THE LOT of a scientific economist in government is frequently not a happy one. Multitudinous cross-currents of business have to be explained in a page or two. Legislators and executives with but legal or military background demand short and snappy forecasts about a chain of events of which only fragments are known, and those are hard even to measure, if indeed measurable. The transition from research cloister to public spotlight is always difficult. The shift which Dr. Arthur F. Burns made from distinguished service as Director of Research for the National Bureau of Economic Research to that of Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers was probably not easy.

The timeliest passage in his book,

The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge, by Arthur F. Burns (Princeton—National Bureau of Economic Research; $5).

while written in 1946, aptly summarizes current public reaction:

> The question now agitating many people is when the next downturn in business will come, and how far it will take us. Men in high stations have made reassuring statements on these matters, and they are likely to multiply in coming months, especially if the downturn occurs. Unfortunately the benevolent pronouncements rarely rest on firm knowledge. The paramount lesson of experience is that the only perfectly regular feature of business cycles is the recurrence of the phenomenon itself. For well over a century business cycles have run an unceasing round. They have persisted through vast economic and social changes; they have withstood countless experiments in industry, agriculture, banking, industrial relations, and public policy; they have confounded forecasters without number, belied repeated prophecies of a "new era of prosperity," and outlived chronic forebodings of "chronic depression." Men who wish to serve democracy faithfully must recognize that the roots of business cycles go deep in our economic organization, that the ability of government to control depressions adequately is not yet assured, that our power of forecasting is limited, and that true foresight requires policies for coping with numerous contingencies.

Burns calls "the opinion that our knowledge of the causes of variation in employment is now sufficient to enable the government to maintain a stable and high level of national income and employment with the framework of our traditional economic organization" a "pleasant but dangerous illusion." It is "easy to exaggerate the influence of government on the course of events" even though in an emergency such as the Korean War it temporarily "becomes a dominant partner."

While recognizing that "prediction is inseparable from life" he warns that "the gift of prophecy has never loomed large in the endowment of economists, whether lay or professional." Moreover, every business cycle is unique.

With scientific humility Dr. Burns deplores "the widespread tendency to theorize about the cycle with little regard for the facts of experience." Hence his distaste for "unique" solutions such as are implied in the "aggregative, mechanical 'real' slant of vulgar Keynesianism."

Fully in line with the basic purpose of the National Bureau when it was founded to "offer no practical advice on how to deal with current issues" the book deals wholly with wide varieties of fact and rarely makes even an implied policy recommendation. But Dr. Burns' present position gives importance even to scattered and isolated statements. Thus in one place he bemoans the fact that "we have failed to exercise the leadership needed to restore that measure of free international trade under which the world once prospered and enjoyed international peace." He hails the democratization of the distributive process that occurred between 1929 and 1946 (the

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fraction of income going to the top 5 percent dropping from 34 down to 16 percent of the total) as a "great moral achievement as well as economic achievement." But he warns:

> there can be no doubt that as high incomes are cut, a point must come when private investors have neither the will nor the power to launch major innovations. Substantial further distribution of incomes may therefore affect adversely the size of the national income, while it cannot improve appreciably the living conditions of the great masses.

Dr. Burns labels as "one of the gravest problems of our time" that of finding "the proper line of division between the functions of government and private enterprise." He feels that "in the short run, an increase in the purchasing capacity of the masses would probably increase the rate of use of plant capacity. But there is little reason to believe that price reduction would of itself lead to closer adjustment of plant capacity to the purchases of householders." Because the principal borrowers are governments, large business firms and wealthy individuals, he looks with disfavor on inflation which hurts small savers. Mild deflation may, indeed, be beneficial.

There are several characteristics of Eisenhower's economic program that dovetail neatly with the views of the Chairman of his Council of Economic Advisers:

1. Its great caution, its recognition of the infinite complexity of business, its reluctance to act until facts demonstrate that a depression lies ahead, not merely a business or employment cycle.

2. Its unwillingness to forecast, to make bold projections of target or "achievable" levels of employment or production or purchasing power. Its failure to indicate to what extent business performance may fall short, or what, if anything, should be done.

3. Its resigned acceptance of 1953 levels or "healthy" rolling readjustment to the highly prosperous level of 1952. This follows naturally from skepticism about the ability of government to do much constructive about it, even if it tried. Some sort of dip may be inevitable—that there will eventually be one is the only certainty. Hence the complacency about the decline in farm income and investment.

4. Its recommendations for tax benefits to entrepreneurs.

5. Its failure to urge price reductions, its complete omission of any mention of monopoloid forces that may have been instrumental in widening the price-spread between raw materials and consumer goods. Is the famous, authoritative study on *The Decline of Competition,* published by Burns in 1936, no longer applicable?

6. Its surprisingly humanitarian proposals for extension of social security coverage to millions of aged and unemployed.

7. Its advocacy of reduction of tariff and trade barriers.

8. Its concern about the growth of government. Hence, its recommendations for turning over oil, water power, atomic energy, etc., to private enterprise.

THEODORE KREPS

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Notes on the Critics

GILBERT MURRAY is probably the world's senior scholar of Hellenic culture. DOROTHY SALISBURY DAVIS is a writer of short stories and of mystery novels. PROFESSOR THEODORE KREPS of Stanford was formerly Staff Director of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report. FREDERICK GUTHEIM is the author of *Homes for Family Living.*

Taste in Houses

NEUTRA's architectural philosophy goes a long ways toward explaining what his southern California architecture has attempted to do. If it is a philosophy of design which others can follow will depend upon whether they can accept the premises here advanced: that a biological imperative to prevent man's will to self-destruction obliges all these who design to do so in terms of life-sustaining criteria which Neutra asserts can be developed through research. This is an act of faith. It would lead, I believe, to a kind of physiological technocracy, at worst a health cult, which hardy creative spirits, even Neutra himself, cannot follow.

Survival Through Design by Richard Neutra (Oxford; $5.50); *What is Modern Interior Design?* by Edgar Kaufmann Jr. (The Museum of Modern Art; $1.25).

If questions of taste and individuality are just what Neutra leaves out, they are the prime concern of Edgar Kaufmann in his excellent pamphlet *What Is Modern Interior Design?* This is American architectural criticism at its best, both in thought and in its admirable, caption-like style of writing, so well suited to a book conceived in terms of its illustrations.

Comfort, quality, lightness and harmony between architecture and furnishings are the qualities Kaufmann finds in modern interiors. Some 40 contemporary rooms are shown, with a dozen others to illustrate the immediate historical background of the modern interior.

The smooth, evenly scaled, highly palatable buildings which Neutra believes are the sole proper objective of the architectural designer appear in the Kaufmann analysis as merely one kind of design, valid in themselves, but in no sense absolute. In the ideal interior, Kaufmann asserts, there is neither excessive emphasis on modern technology, nor on nature:

> A close relationship between man and the natural world around him is assumed but not stressed. We see no fur throws, no "free-form" coffee tables, no tropical plants, no growing trees embodied in rooms. Nor can we find, on the other hand, shiny metal trim, great walls of glass, intricate structure exposed.

FREDERICK J. GUTHEIM

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THEATRE

Giraudoux & Others

IT IS, alas, only since his death in 1943 that many of us have come to see that Giraudoux is a man to reckon with. Sketching the development of recent French drama some years back, I picked out only the names of Apollinaire, Cocteau, Obey, and Sartre. Behrman's version of *Amphitryon 38* had given me the impression that Giraudoux could be ignored; I was unschooled then in the ways of adaptors. In Europe around 1950, Giraudoux confronted me wherever I went: I saw *Siegfried* and *The Trojan War* in Zurich, *Electra* in Munich, *Intermezzo* in Rome, and *Ondine* in Paris. My eyes were opened to many things. I saw, for example, how I had come to overestimate the originality of *The Flies;* the mythological plays of Sartre and Anouilh are inconceivable without Giraudoux. More important, I had to grant that here was a first-rank man of letters consecrating his maturity to the theatre, finding in Louis Jouvet at once a great interpreter and a great instructor, and writing plays which constitute a claim to vast originality, plays which, if we accept them, would give to drama itself a new definition.

This definition is one towards which a great part of modern drama tends. On the technical side, it is a drama in which thought is more important than action or character and in which words are more important than thought. On the philosophical side, it is anti-materialistic, metaphysical, a drama of magic and miracle. I suppose the nearest thing to Giraudoux in our language is Christopher Fry.

Even Fry is not very near. A more legitimate comparison is with the German Romanticists who gave Giraudoux both his philosophy and his dramatic technique (or lack of it). In *Ondine* the German derivation is avowed. The play began with the theme Giraudoux wrote in college on Fouqué's *Undine.* But while the German dwells on the narrative itself—how the water sprite Undine can have a human soul only so long as her lover is faithful—Giraudoux shifts the emphasis to love itself. His sprite represents the pure essence of love; her beloved represents love enmeshed in the ordinary impurities of living.

Trying to summarize *Ondine* I find myself in as much trouble as with *The Confidential Clerk* and for the same reason: these plays have a huge periphery and no satisfactory center, they are full of topics, but if there is a main topic, it is buried beneath too many jewels of wit and wisdom. That is what I meant by saying that, in the end, thought is less important for Giraudoux than words. It is a paradox: there are no words without thoughts but where there are too many thoughts, the effect is of none; the effect is of words, words, words. We call such writing brilliant; we call the author distinguished; but we are enjoying ourselves only intermittently and we don't altogether approve. Such, at any rate, is my experience of *Ondine,* both in French and English.

Not that the two experiences had very much in common. Jouvet, who attributed Giraudoux's success to "the magic of incantation," was apparently going to prove it or have the audience die in his attempt. Distinguished, like his author, he was also, in this play, an insufferable bore.

The New York producers must have seen him and decided that everything should be different. For the furthest you could go from Jouvet is the kind of Hollywood actor who can dress up as King Arthur without concealing his preference for the corner poolroom: the only trouble being that at this point you realize what a lot there was to be said for Jouvet. If he scarcely bothered with characterization, Jouvet at least knew what kind of a play he was in. In a work where aroma is all, he may be said to have had, as it were, the right smell; while his counterpart in New York. . . .

The failure of one performer would not, perhaps, be fatal, even when the part is a big one, were it not that the rest of the cast (without a single exception) seem to take their cue from him. Or did he and the others take their cue from the director, Alfred Lunt? One cannot but wonder if the latter didn't fall asleep at rehearsals (as I witnessed the French audience doing at Jouvet's production). How otherwise could he have permitted character work at the level of summer stock? And failed to find any "line"—of style or meaning? I was also surprised that the designer, Peter Larkin, used—or was allowed to use?—so little imagination. For the Paris production Tchelitchev invented a world of his own; the fairy world of the New York show is pretty much what you'd expect on TV. The costumier has reversed Polonius' advice and given us something gaudy not rich. And the three ondines look like strippers from a nightclub act or Gabriel Pascal's idea of courtesans at the time of Androcles.

The process of vulgarization, evidently promoted by the director, has not touched the script. Amidst all the goings on, Maurice Valency's soberly chosen words often sound like an unheeded call to order. In his adaptation of the play, he does what lies in his power to write in English what Giraudoux wrote in French. There remains the question: what of Giraudoux simply does not come through into English? And it is no fault of a particular translator that the answer is: the aroma, which is the essence. One may, rather, wonder if it is not the fault of Giraudoux; for one may believe that, in drama, the aroma ought *not* to be the essence, the words ought not to take precedence of the thoughts, nor the thoughts of the characters and the action. What is certain is that translation strips Giraudoux' structure rather pitifully naked, and that the second act of *Ondine* stands revealed as a piece of desperate improvizing.

If most of the gifts of Giraudoux fail to shine through the New York production of *Ondine,* there is one that does not, and that is his gift for creating young girls—or perhaps I should say for providing roles for very young actresses: It is not the girl's personality Giraudoux renders but the sparks it throws off. In practical terms, this means that if an actress *can* throw off sparks, Giraudoux will hand her situations and lines to help; in the ideal performance, the actress' contribution might well be larger than his; Audrey Hepburn's Ondine is near enough to the ideal to impress us with this fact. Yes, there are technical flaws. The identical singsong shouldn't be so often repeated. Speech that calls so much attention to itself makes a weak and overemphatic final consonants all too conspicuous. These are motes in the sun. *Ondine* was worth writing, translating, producing just to place Miss Hepburn on stage in such a role. It is not time to speak of a great actress, yet no one would doubt the possibility of greatness. A less academic consideration is that such beauty and such grace of movement gives us theatre, the lovely art we seek so often and so seldom find. ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Rexroth on the Rack

After reading his "The Younger Generation and Its Letters," I had three questions to ask Kenneth Rexroth:

1. Is there any living writer's work you *DO* like?

2. Now that you are through with your introduction, when will you begin the essay?

3. What on earth are you talking about?

Even when I had made allowance for my own density, I could not believe that Mr. Rexroth was driving at anything, unless it be the donkey's tail while blindfolded. When he says, "I don't know anyone under 30 who reads them," in reference to Paul Bowles and Truman Capote, it is obvious that he just doesn't know anyone under 30. When he says *The Catcher in the Rye* is merely a retake of *This Side of Paradise,* he admits that it's a long time since he last read the first and worst of Fitzgerald. When he speaks of an "intermediate group" consisting of Bourjaily, Burns, Merle Miller and others, he does no more than hint that they belong in that vast expanse between super-slicks and *avant-garde-ists* (which is about as helpful as saying that, they are not quite Shakespeares, nor are they quite Edgar Guests).

This copilation of names, sprinkled occasionally with haphazard splash of mud is not my idea of profound literary criticism. Let's have more of Mr. Cowley!

Astoria, N. Y. GEORGE MURRAY

• • •

May I protest the waste of your limited space on such a collection of nonsense opinions as that in Kenneth Rexroth's recent piece?

Spleen, superiority, and plain silliness are not the ingredients of serious articles.

Mr. Rexroth is sure that novels do not "perform the function of a constant symbolic criticism of values." His ultimate critical thesis seems to be that a novel should "speak for" the adolescent, should provide him only with characters similar to people he already knows. Thus he can throw out *en masse* such very different writers as Virginia Woolf, Saul Bellow, Paul Bowles, Jean Stafford and Edith Wharton. "You can scarcely expect a youth who sat out the Korean War to read these authors," Mr. Rexroth explains.

The *New Republic* is doing a very great service, in its front pages, by showing up and opposing the tide of primitivism and dishonest oversimplification that is rising in the country at large. I can see no excuse at all for the literary section to open its pages to a related primitive and boorish coercion of reality.

Plain Fool, N. J. CRYSTAL CUNARD

• • •

I read your pages because I don't like to see myths dressed up as facts. I think you do a fine job, mostly. But Kenneth Rexroth writing of *The Younger Generation and Its Letters,* comes a pratt fall that your editors should have stopped as a bad error of fact. He laments money success in a writer, and the whole text is one hymn of hate against an author making a living. He brings back the stale legend that only the poor hungry artist can create great works of art; and eating well and living warm and having money in the bank is like cutting the throat of talent. This myth is as bad as the kept press and its song that anybody who went to college is an egghead and had better be watched. The facts are that poverty has killed more talent than motion picture rights.

Mark Twain wrote what many think the best American novel, *Huck Finn,* while a pretty rich man and paling around with Standard Oil millionaires (I deplore his taste but like his prose); Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace* (the best novel ever done?) while living on his huge estate as a very wealthy nobleman; Proust was a rich stock market plunger, Dickens was close to a millionaire when he wrote his best books, Sinclair Lewis was filthy rich because of *Main Street,* but he went on to do *Babbit, Arrowsmith* and *Dodsworth.* I think anybody can go on and make a list of hundreds of artists like this one. A cold attic, a hungry belly, a worry about baby's shoes never helped make a work of art better.

A true artist is not ruined by cash on hand, but he is often spoiled by being taken in by the best critics who warp his sense of values.

I don't mean by this to say that any millionaire can write a great work of art, and I certainly don't expect the Texas oil gluttons to bring out any new *Moby Dick* or *David Copperfield.* We know very little about the enigma of creative urge and it would be better not to print nonsense on the subject. Hollywood is a state of mind, the money is not real, and it has not destroyed any great talents; it has produced nothing that has been called literature, but it has never claimed it was an art form. It is a business, and a pretty shabby one at the moment. The writer here is a craftsman, like a good tailor or a fine performer of card tricks. He likes what he does and has no interest in writing *Vanity Fair* or *The Waste Land.* He knows he never could. All talent in time reaches its real level. The artist who is spoiled by money was never the true artist. It was Emerson who said it: "Beware what you desire, for you will get it."

Beverly Hills, Calif. STEPHEN LONGSTREET

► Democratic Revenge

A card is being circulated among businessmen and workers bearing a legend which I think is quite appropos to the present times. It reads: "Don't Tell Me Your Troubles, I voted for Adlai."

Chester, Pa. MORRIS SMITH

► The First Requirement

The great fight to try to separate right from wrong, sense from nonsense, falls on all our shoulders as individuals, but always remember that many of us read *NR* and look to your pages, expecting and usually finding, honest inquiry and courage. No human or group has natural superiority in this exciting job but so rarely does any degree of honesty or guts show in what we read today that I take my cap off to you and add: "Thanks."

One more note of praise for Mr. Bentley's reviews, among many of the events in *NR* that deserve praise. The tone and usual excellence of his comments rarely fail Henry James' first requirement for art: to be interesting.

San Francisco, Calif. A SOLDIER

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► Vote on McCarthy

My reaction to your "One Said No" (*NR*, Feb. 15) was a feeling of sickening disgust relieved partly by the thought that at least one man dared to say "No" to what 85 of his colleagues said "Yes." Senator Fulbright's lone "No" to McCarthy's request of $214,000 for his Subcommittee must have rung out defiantly through the Senate chamber and reverberated long after the session was over. They knew or should have known that by appeasing McCarthy the Democratic Party will not escape the charge of "treason," that sooner or later there will have to be a showdown on whether Communism is a partisan, or national and world issue, that "democracy is more likely to be destroyed by the perversion and abandonment of its principles than by an armed attack from Russia."

"When public men . . . resort to innuendo and insinuation, to libel, scandal and suspicion," and there's "no apparatus to deal with the boor, the liar, the lout and the anti-democrat in general," a substantial vote against the grant would serve as a reminder that "our democracy is outraged" at their indecent behavior. It would also serve notice on the Eisenhower Administration to totally and unequivocally embrace or reject McCarthyism, that while political morality lacks fixed standards, it cannot be allowed to descend into the dark bottomless pit.

Or is it possible that the miasma of fear, hysteria and suspicion . . . has crept into the Senate?

Philadelphia, Pa. MAX BISER

. . .

Senator Morse's imposing record of nonpartisan liberalism expressed in some of his occasional articles in *NR* raised hopes of his becoming a valued successor to the editorial role of our late lamented Harold Ickes.

However, Senator Morse's participation in the long side of the recent overwhelming vote to approve in full Senator McCarthy's demanded appropriation for the continued maintenance of his subcommittee for investigation must have come as a shock to some of Morse's admirers.

So far, lack of any Senatorial explanation of that surprising situation has equated the silence of our national press regarding it. It might be illuminating and perhaps gratifying to your readers if Senator Morse were to relieve their perplexity.

New York, N. Y. JESSE WEIL

. . .

As I said on the Senate floor on February 24, I shall not vote to deny a committee the power to investigate some matter even when the investigation is being conducted by the junior Senator from Wisconsin. I had become satisfied that the junior Senator from Wisconsin had made a *prima facie* case for the amount of money he asked for.

But I also made it clear that I thought the Senate should adopt a mandatory code of procedure which I think is sorely needed to check the procedural abuses of the McCarthy committee as well as of other committees.

Washington, D. C. WAYNE L. MORSE

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NEW REPUBLIC

BANDWAGON

Two mass parachute jumps into the chill, thin air 1,000 feet above the high plains east of the Rocky Mountains today injured 20 Army paratroopers. Three were hospitalized. . . .

"This was one of the best parachute operations we ever have conducted," said Col. John D. Cone, commanding the regiment. – *Los Angeles Times, Feb. 17, 1954.*

. . .

I should like to submit that there is no single man in contemporary history who has been subjected to more scurrilous, vindictive, personal diatribes than has Joseph R. McCarthy. . . .

In the name of the decency and fair play which those opposed to McCarthy pretend to espouse, let's stay with objective appraisals of the facts and stop this irresponsible name-calling and character assassination. – *From a letter in Palo Alto Times Forum, February 18, 1954.*

. . .

According to the police, the high-spirited juveniles didn't do anything very serious, but were involved in such acts as breaking windows, slashing automobile tires, pulling up shrubbery and breaking into the school building after hours. – *New York Times, February 20, 1954.*

. . .

Ben B. Bliss, advertising agent, said last week the *Daily Worker* has declined to run a $25 ad for a bestseller book on the Rosenberg case because the subject covered in it is "too controversial." – *Editor & Publisher, January 30, 1954.*

. . .

At noon, Wayne E. Richards, Commander-in-Chief of the VFW, said in a nationally broadcast speech from the George Mason Hotel in Alexandria that the VFW would "continue to carry out the specific request of three Administrations to give to the FBI names of those where there is a reasonable doubt that they are subversive." – *Washington Post, February 23, 1954.*

. . .

The general (Zwicker) was disturbed about reports emanating from the (McCarthy) hearing that he was suffering from a heart ailment because he had an Army doctor at his side. He said that the doctor had been there to give him treatment for a virus. – *New York Times, February 23, 1954.*

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•

"I have been a reader of your magazine since my teens, some 20 odd years. When I have not been a subscriber I have never failed to buy a copy at the newsstand—that I believe indicates how much I value the NR.

"When I read the back cover of the February 15 issue I felt as though I were reading a letter from a very valued friend informing me of his being in distress . . . and that indeed is how I feel."

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"America could just as well drop the Eagle as to drop the New Republic."

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"I (and my husband) look to you, among the rare publications we see, to stand up against totalitarian inroads upon what we view as the American way."

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"As one of your old subscribers, I have followed the fortunes of the New Republic *with unabated interest and with admiration for its courage, integrity and fairmindedness.*

"Now that misfortune is lurking, the danger of losing an invaluable and indispensable voice comes with alarming impact.

"The enclosed is sent with my regret that it cannot be more. With it goes my appreciation for all you have been and done, and what I personally hope you may continue to be and do."

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"I have been buying the NR *at the newsstands for the better part of a quarter century, and I think it's almost time I subscribe . . . more secure for both of us! It is an invaluable periodical on which I rely for sober analysis of current events to counteract the hasty, uncritical and frequently loaded headlines of the daily press. To thinking individuals outside the major metropolises its value must be incalculable. More power to you!"*

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"We, too, want to see the New Republic *continue."*

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"Your liberal, enlightened, informed and unbiased treatment of the news has helped to keep my confidence in my country. . . . I would consider it a disaster for you to have to abandon publication."

About six months ago, in a special mail survey, we asked a sampling of *New Republic* readers some questions about their views, tastes and opinions of the value of this Journal of Opinion. Fifty percent of those surveyed returned the long questionnaire; we learned many things about them and ourselves.

During the past few weeks we have again been hearing from a great many readers—letters from housewives, editors, businessmen, teachers, government officials, union members and those who have retired.

These letters have told us more than any questionnaire has or could.

They have reminded us, at a time when we needed the reminder, that the *New Republic* is felt to be indispensable by thousands of thoughtful, independent Americans.

This first response to the *New Republic's* continuing appeal for financial support is not the sort of thing we can describe in a single phrase. The closest we can come was the line from one reader:

"Keep the presses rolling!"

Our belief, shared by such distinguished citizens as Adlai Stevenson, Paul G. Hoffman, Walter Reuther, Marquis Childs and John S. Knight, in the importance to America's free press of an honest, unbossed, often dissenting publication has been strengthened greatly. Certainly no editors could hope for a finer vote of confidence than we have been receiving lately.

We have a long way to go before solvency is in sight. Meanwhile, until that goal is reached, won't you cast *your* vote of confidence?

YOU CAN HELP!

MICHAEL STRAIGHT
1826 Jefferson Place, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Mr. Straight,

I too believe that the voice of the *NEW REPUBLIC* should not be silenced. So that it may not be, I enclose my contribution of $.....

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY..... **STATE**.....

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